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RATIONAL DISCRIMINATION AND SHARED 
COMPLIANCE:  LESSONS FROM TITLE IV OF 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
Michael Steven Stein* and Emily Teplin** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years after the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was 
enacted, the state of communication access for deaf people is the tale of 
two ADAs.1  Consider the hypothetical circumstance of a deaf man who 
has moved to a new town and needs to find a new dentist.  After 
identifying a dentist who has received favorable reviews online, the deaf 
man turns on his videophone and enters the dental office’s phone 
number.  His telephone call is automatically routed to a call operating 
center which connects him to an American Sign Language (“ASL”) 
interpreter within five seconds.  The interpreter communicates with the 
deaf man in ASL through her own videophone, but she also wears a 
headset connected to a telephone.  She introduces herself to the deaf 
man, gives him her interpreter identification number, and then initiates 
the call by dialing the requested phone number. 
                                                 
* Partner, Stein & Vargas, LLP.  Prior to joining Stein & Vargas, LLP, which specializes 
in disability discrimination including discrimination against deaf individuals, Stein was a 
Skadden Fellow with the National Association of the Deaf. 
** Law Clerk for the Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Court for the 
District of Minnesota.  Teplin previously represented deaf and hard of hearing people as an 
Equal Justice Works Fellow at the Minnesota Disability Law Center.  The authors thank 
Marc Charmatz, Michele Friedner, Nicholas Hengen, Heidi Kitrosser, Rick Macpherson, 
Ortal Meir, John Stanton, and Julie Wilensky for their helpful critiques and suggestions. 
1 For the sake of convenience, we will generally use the term “deaf” in this Article to 
refer to individuals who communicate primarily in ASL.  However, the word “deaf” 
actually applies to individuals with a widely diverse range of communication styles and 
preferences, not all of whom sign.  Communication preferences range from spoken English 
to Signed Exact English to Cued Speech, to name but a few.  See Michael A. Schwartz, Deaf 
Patients, Doctors, and the Law:  Compelling a Conversation About Communication, 35 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 947, 948 n.1 (2008) (stating that estimates of signing deaf people range from 300,000 
to 2,000,000).  Moreover, the phrase “deaf people” may include those individuals who are 
deaf, hard of hearing, deaf-blind, and late deafened.  Many deaf individuals who identify 
as culturally deaf and communicate primarily in ASL refer to themselves as Deaf (with the 
capitalized ‘D’) to emphasize their position as a linguistic and cultural minority.  See 
generally CAROL PADDEN & TOM HUMPHRIES, DEAF IN AMERICA:  VOICES FROM A CULTURE 
(1988).  Since not all deaf people identify as Deaf, we adopt the more general term deaf.  
While this Article is focused on access to interpreter services for deaf people who 
communicate primarily in ASL, the bulk of our discussion is equally applicable to access 
for a wide range of deaf and hard of hearing people who do not know sign language and 
may benefit instead from other forms of accommodation such as captioning. 
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The dentist’s receptionist answers the phone.  The interpreter 
introduces the call, explaining that the caller is using ASL and that she 
will facilitate communication between him and the hearing caller.  The 
interpreter then “connects” the call, and the deaf man states his name in 
sign language and asks to schedule an appointment.  The receptionist, 
using nothing but his voice and regular telephone, discusses 
appointment dates with the deaf man through the interpreter.  When the 
appointment has been booked, the deaf man signs his request that the 
office provide a sign language interpreter during the appointment.  The 
receptionist puts the call on hold to consult with the dentist, who 
performs a simple cost-benefit analysis:  the office charges $120 for a 
basic dental hygiene visit and consultation with an approximate net 
profit of $50.  The cost of a sign language interpreter in her area is $45 
per hour with a two-hour minimum.  The dentist concludes that she will 
“lose” money—$40, representing the cost of the visit ($120) minus typical 
expenditures ($70) and the cost of the interpreter ($90)—on the deaf 
patient.  She instructs the receptionist to tell him that he is welcome to 
make an appointment but that her office will not provide an interpreter; 
instead, the dentist will communicate with him by writing notes back 
and forth. 
There are two ADAs in this story:  (1) the law that enabled the deaf 
man to place, for free, a telephone call and book a dental appointment in 
ASL with the same ease as a hearing person, and (2) the law that was 
supposed to, but ultimately did not, ensure the deaf man effective 
communication with the dentist during his actual appointment.  
Although the dentist offered to write notes back and forth with the deaf 
man, writing may not result in effective communication if the deaf man’s 
primary means of communication is ASL, a visual language entirely 
distinct from English, with its own grammar and syntax.2  Moreover, 
even if the deaf man has a good command of English (as do many deaf 
and hard of hearing people), the slow process of writing notes may 
severely limit the extent and complexity of the interactive dialogue that 
the dentist typically has with hearing patients.  The dentist’s analysis 
focused not on which means of communication would result in effective 
communication but rather on identifying her cheapest option. 
This tale of two ADAs turns on economic incentives.  The deaf man’s 
call was regulated by Title IV of the ADA, which requires common 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., EEOC v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 620 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“[ASL’s] grammar and syntax differ from the grammar and syntax of English and other 
spoken languages.  In many cases, there is no one-to-one correspondence between signs in 
ASL and words in the English language.” (citations omitted)); Calloway v. Boro of 
Glassboro Dep’t of Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547 n.9 (D.N.J. 2000). 
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carriers to ensure functionally equivalent telephone services for people 
with hearing and speech impairments.3  The Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”), which is charged with implementing Title IV, 
established a regulatory regime that assesses a tax on all common 
carriers for this purpose.  The resulting revenues contribute to a fund 
which compensates relay service providers for their services.  Relay 
service providers can turn a profit by providing free relay services for 
deaf people wishing to call hearing individuals and then seeking 
reimbursement from the relay service fund; indeed, the relay services 
industry now generates nearly $1 billion per year.  Providers therefore 
compete for the privilege of providing free sign language interpreters for 
the deaf man to call his dentist. 
But what economic motive existed for the dentist to pay for an 
interpreter to communicate with her deaf patient during the actual 
appointment?  None, except perhaps the fear of litigation.  Title III of the 
ADA requires places of public accommodations, such as a dental office, 
to pay for qualified interpreters when necessary to ensure effective 
communication with a deaf person.4  The law prohibits the dentist from 
charging her deaf patient for the cost of interpreter services.5  Although a 
dentist’s office may assert the affirmative defense that providing 
interpreter services for a deaf patient who requests them poses an 
“undue burden,”6 the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has taken the 
position that covered entities cannot simply compare the cost of the 
interpreter with the likely revenue from the deaf individual’s business, 
as the dentist in our hypothetical did.7  Rather, “undue burden” factors 
include the covered entity’s overall resources and the availability of tax 
credits to compensate the entity for part of the cost.8  It is doubtful that 
the dentist could establish that “losing” approximately $40 for a single 
office visit posed an undue burden.9  The dentist likely violated Title III 
by refusing to provide an interpreter for the deaf man’s visit. 
However, as we discuss in this Article, dentists as well as lawyers 
and innumerable other entities covered by the ADA routinely make 
precisely the same calculation our hypothetical dentist made despite the 
                                                 
3 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2006). 
4 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2006). 
5 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(c) (2010). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
7 See Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to Sen. Joseph I. 
Lieberman (Sept. 8, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/foia/readingroom/ 
frequent_requests/ada_tal/tal801.php. 
8 See id.  Limited tax credits are codified at 26 U.S.C. § 44 (2006). 
9 We are aware of no court that has held, as a matter of law, that providing interpreter 
services constitutes an undue burden under the ADA. 
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specter of liability.10  Even large entities with presumably deeper 
pockets, including multinational corporations and governmental 
agencies, which are also required to provide auxiliary aids such as 
interpreter services to ensure equal access to its services,11 bristle at the 
cost of communicating effectively with deaf people.12 
It is easy to see why the ADA is often referred to as an “unfunded 
mandate.”13  Under Titles I through III, the cost of paying for interpreter 
services and other means of ensuring effective communication with deaf 
people generally falls to those entities that happen to be approached by 
individual deaf people.  Entities perform a cost-benefit analysis that 
often leads them to risk liability and refuse to pay, even when the cost of 
making their services accessible would not be overly burdensome. 
We do not mean to downplay the successes that the ADA has had in 
opening many doors for deaf people.  Many covered entities now 
provide auxiliary aids and services as a matter of course.  The workplace, 
government services, and the marketplace are generally much more 
accessible today than they were before the ADA was enacted.  However, 
we observe that while many covered entities do in fact comply with the 
ADA, there remains a sizeable number of entities which do not fulfill 
their legal obligations to ensure communication access, and thus 
equality, for deaf people. 
The hard fact remains that after twenty years, deaf people still 
struggle to access employment opportunities, government services, and 
public accommodations in a manner commensurate with that enjoyed by 
hearing people.  By contrast, Title IV has ensured virtually uniform 
industry-wide ADA compliance and readily available tools for hearing 
and deaf people to communicate with each other with ease through relay 
services.  Our aim in this Article is to explain why Title IV has been so 
much more effective in achieving its goals than Titles I through III. 
In this Article, we expand on the tale of two ADAs and offer our 
simple hypothesis:  deaf people enjoy greater access to 
telecommunication services than they do in any other context because 
Title IV mandates that the entire telecommunications industry share the 
                                                 
10 See infra Part II.B.3.  Indeed, the facts of this hypothetical are loosely based on 
Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Mich. 1994), a representative case discussed 
at some length below. 
11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182; 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130, 35.160, 36.303 (2010). 
12 See, e.g., Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 855 (8th Cir. 1999) (identifying the state 
correctional department as asserting undue burden to provide sign language interpreter for 
deaf prisoner to attend hearings, medical appointments, and educational programs). 
13 See, e.g., Russell Powell, Beyond Lane:  Who is Protected by the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, Who Should Be?, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 25, 53 (2004) (referencing the ADA’s requirement 
that employers provide reasonable accommodations to employees with disabilities). 
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cost of communication access regardless of which company’s services 
deaf people use.  Titles I through III, in contrast, generally impose the 
cost on individual covered entities only when they encounter deaf 
people. 
In Part II, we summarize the requirements of Titles I through III as 
they pertain to deaf people.  Communication barriers pose the greatest 
hindrance to the inclusion of deaf people in society, and the ADA 
requires effective communication and the provision of auxiliary aids and 
services as a means of achieving equality.  These access mandates have 
resulted in greater access for deaf people, but rampant noncompliance 
and underenforcement of Titles I through III have severely hindered full 
inclusion of deaf people in all aspects of society. 
In Part III, we discuss how the successes of Titles I through III have 
been limited by the perpetuation of economic disincentives in the context 
of disability rights in general, and deaf communication access in 
particular.  The ADA locates the “problem” of disability in the 
environment rather than in the person with a disability, and accordingly 
imposes costs associated with redressing inaccessibility on entities that 
foster the inaccessible or disabling environments.  Like traditional 
antidiscrimination law, the ADA prohibits discrimination even when it is 
economically rational, but equality for deaf people requires real, 
quantifiable, ongoing expenditures.  We agree with those scholars who 
argue that, as an antidiscrimination law, the ADA appropriately requires 
covered entities to take the necessary steps to ensure effective 
communication.  However, we also argue that increased compliance 
with the law, which will translate into increased accessibility for deaf 
people, requires a broader and preemptive redistribution of the cost of 
communication access. 
We turn in Part IV to the “other” ADA, Title IV, which provides a 
powerful illustration of what happens when the law compels an entire 
industry to share the cost of communication access and to do so in 
anticipation of—rather than in response to—encounters with deaf 
people.  The enforcement failures of the other titles of the ADA contrast 
with the overall success of Title IV.  Title IV’s shared funding mechanism 
has resulted in the near complete accessibility of telecommunications 
and a vibrant marketplace for relay service providers competing to 
provide the best services to deaf people.  Relay services are not without 
flaws—in our experience, most deaf people strongly prefer on-site 
interpreter services to interpreters who appear remotely via video feed—
but the ubiquitous compliance issues in the context of Titles I through III 
are conspicuously absent when it comes to Title IV. 
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In Part V, we present some illustrations of how entities covered by 
Titles I through III of the ADA have semi-voluntarily (often as the result 
of settling lawsuits) adopted Title IV’s principle of sharing the cost of 
communication access.  In Part VI, we explore other potential 
opportunities to expand the success of Title IV beyond telephone access 
while also acknowledging their limits.  Our primary goal is to explain 
how Title IV’s shared compliance mandate works to address the 
entrenched problem of economically rational discrimination in Titles I 
through III and to suggest several ways to expand on its success. 
II.  THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION 
A. Legal Requirements of Titles I–III 
We begin with a brief overview of the best-known provisions of the 
ADA, specifically as they apply to deaf individuals.  The ADA is 
intended “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for 
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”14  
It prohibits discrimination in “three major areas of public life”:  
employment (Title I), public services (Title II), and public 
accommodations (Title III).15  For deaf people who communicate 
primarily in sign language, the ADA seeks to achieve full inclusion by 
establishing a right to effective communication through the provision of 
auxiliary aids and services which include sign language interpreters and 
captioning. 
Title I prohibits employment discrimination “on the basis of 
disability.”16  Under Title I, discrimination includes an employer’s failure 
to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is 
an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate 
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business of such covered entity.”17  Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations define reasonable 
accommodations as “[m]odifications or adjustments that enable a 
covered entity’s employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and 
privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated 
employees without disabilities.”18  Reasonable accommodations and 
modifications vary based on the individual deaf employee or applicant’s 
                                                 
14 42 U.S.C § 12101(b)(1). 
15 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516 (2004). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 2008). 
17 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006). 
18 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii) (2010). 
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circumstances; frequently they involve interpreter services for meetings 
and training sessions,19 but they may also encompass unusual requests, 
such as a fan for a factory worker whose hearing aid was negatively 
affected by “steam-induced perspiration.”20 
Title II provides that deaf people shall not “be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity.”21  Title II’s regulations, promulgated by the DOJ,22 specify that 
public entities must “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services 
where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal 
opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, 
program, or activity.”23  Moreover, they must ensure that 
“communications with applicants, participants, and members of the 
public with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.”24 
Auxiliary aids can include the services of a qualified interpreter, 
telecommunication devices or personal device assistants, or even writing 
on a pen and paper or employing gestures to communicate.25  The 
“length and complexity of the communication” determines the 
appropriate method for providing effective communication.26  
Accordingly, the law may be violated when a public entity relies on 
written notes to communicate when interpreter services are necessary to 
ensure effective communication under the particular circumstances.27  
Moreover, in determining what type of auxiliary aid and service is 
necessary for a given circumstance, public entities are required to give 
“primary consideration” to the request of the deaf person.28  A public 
entity must normally honor the request of the deaf person unless it can 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999). 
20 Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 257–58 (1st Cir. 1999). 
21 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
22 The EEOC promulgates regulations for Title I, the employment provision of the ADA, 
while the DOJ is responsible for Titles II and III.  Regulations for Title IV, discussed in 
depth below, are under the auspices of the Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”). 
23 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1) (2010). 
24 Id. § 35.160(a) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Boyer v. Tift Cnty. Hosp. Auth., No. 7:06-cv-
027, 2008 WL 2986283, at *5 (M.D. Ga. July 31, 2008) (“The [Title II] regulations charge 
Defendant hospital with the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that it could 
communicate with Plaintiff as effectively as it could communicate with its hearing patients.  
Further, Defendant hospital was responsible for furnishing Plaintiff with a qualified 
interpreter—if she so desired—so she could be properly treated while hospitalized.”). 
25 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. 
26 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADA TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL COVERING STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND SERVICES § II-7.1000 (1993), available at 
http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-7.1000. 
27 See, e.g., Center v. City of West Carrollton, 227 F. Supp. 2d 863 (S.D. Ohio 2002). 
28 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2). 
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demonstrate that another effective means of communication exists or 
that the use of the requested communication method would result in a 
“fundamental alteration” of its program or service or would impose an 
undue financial or administrative burden.29 
Title III likewise requires public accommodations to ensure effective 
communication with deaf individuals through the provision of auxiliary 
aids and services.30  Public accommodations are typically asked to ensure 
effective communication through the provision of auxiliary aids and 
services such as sign language interpreters,31 but the law also applies to 
structural modifications such as a sign at a drive-thru restaurant menu 
instructing deaf patrons to proceed to the window.32  Unlike Title II, Title 
III does not include regulatory language compelling the entity to afford 
“primary consideration” to the deaf person’s request for a particular 
means of communication.  The public accommodation is ultimately 
responsible for deciding which, if any, auxiliary aids or services to 
employ, but it maintains legal responsibility for providing 
communication as effective as communication with others.33 
Small businesses34 are eligible for a fifty percent tax credit up to 
$5,000 for making expenditures to comply with the ADA, including 
paying for auxiliary aids and services such as interpreter services and 
captioning.35  After spending $250, they may take a fifty percent tax 
credit on expenditures up to $10,250.  This scheme, however, still leaves 
businesses liable for the majority of expenses, especially as they may 
encounter deaf consumers infrequently and not spend enough to qualify 
for the tax credit or for more than a small portion of the tax credit.  In 
addition, it is entirely unavailable to government agencies and larger 
businesses.36 
                                                 
29 Id. § 35.164; see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local 
Government Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,183 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. 
pt. 35). 
30 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). 
31 See, e.g., Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2009). 
32 Bunjer v. Edwards, 985 F. Supp. 165, 166 (D.D.C. 1997). 
33 See Kerr v. Heather Gardens Ass’n, No. 09-cv-00409-MSK-MJW, 2010 WL 3791484, at 
*4 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 2010) (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B) (“[C]ommunication with the 
disabled individual must be as effective as that with a non-disabled individual.  Use of the 
most advanced technology is not required, however, as long as the accommodation 
selected results in effective communication.” (internal citations omitted)). 
34 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 44(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2006) (stating that “eligible small business[es]” are 
those with either gross receipts not exceeding $1,000,000 or businesses which do not 
employ more than thirty full-time employees). 
35 See id. 
36 Id. (indicating that by its terms, the tax provision applies only to “eligible small 
business[es]”). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 [2011], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss3/7
2011] Lessons from Title IV of the ADA 1103 
B. The Extent of Noncompliance 
The ADA has resulted in the greater inclusion of deaf people in 
society.  Not all covered entities refuse to provide sign language 
interpreters and other auxiliary aids upon request so that they can 
communicate effectively with deaf people.  Our focus is on 
noncompliance not because we think Titles I through III have entirely 
failed in their laudable goals, but because we think that the ADA can be 
made much more effective than it has been in its first twenty years. 
It is difficult to measure the precise extent of noncompliance with 
Titles I through III.  We do not attempt to undertake an empirical study 
of how and when covered entities decide to provide auxiliary aids and 
services.  We note, however, that there is a strong consensus among 
scholars and empirical evidence suggesting that the ADA generally—not 
just as it applies to deaf people—is subject to widespread 
noncompliance.37 
In our personal experiences representing deaf individuals across the 
country, we have had deaf clients tell us that they contacted a dozen or 
more doctors before they found one willing to provide sign language 
interpreters.  We have observed that entities are not always willing to 
hire an interpreter immediately after an initial request and will instead 
insist that a less costly approach, such as writing notes, results in equally 
effective communication even when voluminous amounts of information 
are being provided or the deaf person lacks strong reading and writing 
skills.  
Our anecdotal experiences are supported by a wealth of case law in 
which entities both large and small in a variety of contexts refuse to 
ensure effective communication.  Below, we examine illustrative cases 
litigated under each of the first three titles of the ADA involving the 
refusal by covered entities to provide sign language interpreters. 
1. EEOC v. Federal Express Corp.38 
Ronald Lockhart is deaf and his primary means of communication is 
American Sign Language.39  He has not mastered the English language 
                                                 
37 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies:  The Case of 
“Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (noting “a strong 
consensus . . . emerging among experts that the ADA’s [Title III] public accommodations 
title is underenforced”); Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate:  An Empirical Study of the 
Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (analyzing research regarding ADA Title I claims). 
38 513 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2008). 
39 Id. at 364. 
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and communicates with his wife and children in ASL.40  From March 
2000 to January 2003, Lockhart worked as a package handler at an 
airport facility of Federal Express.41  When he initially applied for the 
position, FedEx refused his request to provide an interpreter for his job 
interview.  Despite FedEx’s legal obligations under the ADA, Lockhart 
supplied his own interpreter (a friend) for both the interview and a 
subsequent multiday orientation session “because he ‘really wanted the 
job,’ and because he ‘felt as if [he] had no other choice.’”42 
Although Lockhart did not need an interpreter to perform his 
essential job duties as a package handler sorting and processing mail, he 
requested an interpreter on numerous occasions for FedEx’s mandatory 
employee trainings and meetings concerning “essential topics for its 
employees, such as workplace safety, job training, and employee 
benefits.”43  FedEx categorically refused his requests.  As a result, 
Lockhart missed the information conveyed in employee meetings and 
was on some occasions not even informed about their occurrence.44  
Lockhart’s inability to participate in employee meetings became 
particularly unsettling after September 11, 2001, when he missed 
receiving “vast amount[s] of information” about safety protocols because 
of FedEx’s continuing denial of interpreter services.45  A jury concluded 
that FedEx discriminated against Lockhart, awarding both compensatory 
and punitive damages which were subsequently upheld on appeal.46 
2. Mosier v. Commonwealth of Kentucky47 
Teri Mosier is a deaf attorney admitted to the Kentucky bar.48  
Without auxiliary aids and services such as sign language interpreters, 
she cannot understand court proceedings.  The Kentucky Court of Justice 
had a policy of providing sign language interpreters to ensure effective 
communication with litigants, jurors, and witnesses, but not with 
attorneys.49  When Mosier requested sign language interpreters for her 
                                                 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 365 (alteration in original). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 366. 
45 Id. at 367. 
46 Id. 
47 Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier II), 675 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Ky. 2009).  Author Michael 
Steven Stein was co-counsel on this case. 
48 Id. at 694. 
49 Id. at 698. 
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court appearances as a solo practitioner, the Kentucky Court of Justice 
refused her request.50 
In 2008, Mosier filed a lawsuit against several state defendants 
alleging that the Kentucky Court of Justice violated Title II in refusing to 
provide auxiliary aids and services to ensure effective communication 
with her during her court appearances as an attorney.51  The state 
defendants asserted undue burden as an affirmative defense.52  They 
further argued in part that Mosier’s employer (she was self-employed at 
the time), and not the Kentucky Court of Justice, was the entity 
responsible for providing sign language interpreters for Mosier’s court 
appearances.  The court rejected this argument, ruling that Title II 
applied to “all services, programs and activities made available by public 
entities.”53  The parties eventually settled, with the Kentucky Court of 
Justice agreeing to provide auxiliary aids and services when necessary to 
ensure effective communication with deaf attorneys. 
3. Mayberry v. Von Valtier 
Dr. Cheryl Von Valtier was the primary care physician for Shirley 
Mayberry, a deaf individual.  During physical examinations, they 
communicated through writing or by using a “signor,” who was often 
one of Mayberry’s children.54 
On three occasions, however, an agency provided sign language 
interpreters.  Once, when an interpreter was present, Dr. Von Valtier 
realized that an earlier diagnosis had probably been incorrect and wrote 
in the chart that to the misdiagnosis likely resulted from “poor 
communication.”55  On two of the three occasions that an interpreter was 
present, Dr. Von Valtier did not have to pay for the interpreters.  On the 
third occasion, the interpreter submitted a bill for $28.  Dr. Von Valtier 
paid the bill and sent the following letter to the interpreter: 
 Enclosed is payment for your services to Shirley 
Mayberry in this office 12/18/92.  The Medicare 
payment for Mrs. Mayberry’s office visit has been 
received, and I would now like to explain why I won’t 
                                                 
50 Id. at 695. 
51 Id. at 697.  Mosier also asserted a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a 
predecessor to the ADA applicable to government entities and generally analyzed 
identically with the ADA.  See, e.g., Buboltz v. Residential Advantages, Inc., 523 F.3d 864, 
868 (8th Cir. 2008). 
52 Mosier v. Kentucky (Mosier I), 640 F. Supp. 2d 875, 878 (E.D. Ky. 2009). 
53 Id. at 878–79 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(a) (1999)). 
54 Mayberry v. Von Valtier, 843 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 
55 Id. 
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be able to utilize your services in the future, or indeed 
why I really can’t afford to take care of Mrs. Mayberry at 
all. 
 My regular fee for a 15 minute office visit is $40.00.  I 
spent about 45 minutes with Mrs. Mayberry on 
December 12, 1992, for this I was paid $37.17 by 
Medicare and (hopefully) $9.29 by Mrs. Mayberry.  My 
office overhead expense rate is a rather steady 70% of 
my gross receipts, which means that for that 45 minutes 
I was able to “pocket” $13.94, that is, until I paid your 
bill for $28.00. 
 I certainly hope that the Federal Government does 
not further slash this outrageous profit margin.56 
Subsequently, Mayberry brought suit and sought an injunction 
requiring Dr. Von Valtier to continue to treat her and to pay for an 
interpreter for medical appointments.  Mayberry further requested that 
the court order Dr. Von Valtier “to promulgate policies and procedures 
for providing interpreters to ensure effective communication” with deaf 
patients and notify them of their right to auxiliary aids and services.57  
The court denied the doctor’s motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that there was “ample evidence to establish an issue of fact 
whether defendant intended to discriminate against plaintiff and 
withhold future accommodation, or was merely protesting her duty to 
accommodate handicapped patients.”58 
4. Lessons 
Mayberry is notable for Dr. Von Valtier’s frank admission that she 
performed a cost-benefit analysis and concluded that it did not make 
financial sense for her to continue to use interpreter services.  Similarly, 
in Mosier, the Kentucky Court of Justice asserted the defense of undue 
burden and further tried to shift to her employer the obligation to pay 
for interpreters (even though Mosier was self-employed at the time).  In 
Lockhart, the company apparently did not see the value of 
communicating effectively with one of its package handlers as 
outweighing the cost of retaining occasional interpreter services to 
communicate with him. 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1163. 
58 Id. at 1168. 
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As these cases show, both larger entities (i.e., FedEx and the 
Kentucky Court of Justice) and smaller entities (Dr. Von Valtier’s office) 
are reluctant to provide auxiliary aids and services despite legal 
obligations to do so for the simple reason that it requires them to incur 
expenses.  They hesitated to pay for interpreters even though the 
requests for interpreter services generally tended to be intermittent—for 
meetings, trainings, interviews, and court appearances, for example—as 
opposed to regular requests for daily services.  In other words, far from 
imposing an undue burden, requests for interpreter services generally 
impose a cost that is de minimis when compared to a covered entity’s 
available financial resources.  Nonetheless, entities routinely refuse to 
ensure effective communication when providing auxiliary aids and 
services seems economically irrational. 
As the foregoing shows, many deaf people encounter a glass ceiling 
at work or are otherwise unable to benefit fully and equally from 
services in the public or private sector because covered entities refuse to 
pay for interpreters or other accommodations, no matter how minor, that 
might cut into the employers’ profit margin.59  In Part III, we discuss 
some of the theoretical underpinnings of the ADA to explain why Titles I 
through III are established in a way that perpetuates these economic 
disincentives, before examining in Part IV how Title IV removes the 
disincentives without deviating from the antidiscrimination principles 
animating the law. 
III.  THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS:  AN IMPERFECT INHERITANCE FROM 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
The problems hindering compliance with Titles I through III are in 
many ways rooted in two important principles underlying the economic 
structure of those provisions:  (1) the social model of disability, and (2) 
the understanding of antidiscrimination as encompassing 
accommodations.  These ideas have resulted in a legal regime that places 
the cost of communication access on the individual entity that 
encounters the deaf person, rather than, for example, on the deaf person 
herself or on society at large.  However, as we explained in Part II, 
individual entities are eager to avoid any expenditure for 
accommodations and the result has been rampant noncompliance.  The 
economic disincentives to comply with the ADA are compounded by 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., EEOC v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 620 F.3d 1103, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(interpreter requested for occasional meetings and required computer training); Downing 
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (interpreter 
requested for hearing test related to Department of Transportation driving certification). 
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enforcement problems, notably Title III’s prohibition on demands for 
damages.  What is missing in the funding structure of Titles I through III 
is the key feature of Title IV:  compulsory shared responsibility for the 
cost of ADA compliance among an industry or economic sector.  
A. The Social Model of Disability and Universal Design 
In her anthropological study of a community on Martha’s Vineyard 
from the eighteenth through early twentieth centuries, Nora Groce 
explains how a disproportionately high rate of hereditary deafness lead 
most of the hearing population to learn a form of sign language.60  
According to the hearing islanders Groce interviewed,61 the deaf 
islanders were fully included in island society; sign language was so 
commonplace that hearing islanders sometimes used it to communicate 
with each other even when no deaf people were present.62  In that 
context, deafness was not a “disabling” condition. 
The principle derived from Groce’s study, as well as the work of 
other scholars,63 is that “disability” is a product of environmental 
conditions rather than inherent characteristics of the “disabled” person.  
This “social model of disability” is a basic tenet of disability rights.  As 
Tom Shakespeare has discussed, “[w]hile the problems of disabled 
people have been explained historically in terms of divine punishment 
[and] karma or moral failing, . . . the disability [rights] movement has 
focused attention onto social oppression, cultural discourse, and 
environmental barriers.”64  The social model’s policy objectives “point[] 
away from medical treatment and charity and toward civil rights.”65 
In the context of deafness, the disability arises when a hearing 
person cannot communicate in sign language and the deaf person with 
whom she wants to communicate cannot speak clearly or understand 
what the other person is saying.  If our society were like the community 
in Martha’s Vineyard discussed in Groce’s study and everyone knew 
                                                 
60 NORA ELLEN GROCE, EVERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN LANGUAGE:  HEREDITARY DEAFNESS 
ON MARTHA’S VINEYARD (1985). 
61 Id. at 6.  No deaf islanders were alive when Groce conducted her research, so she 
relied on elderly hearing islanders’ recollections and documentary evidence.  Id. 
62 Id. at 63–67. 
63 See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 111 (1990) (describing the 
“social-relations approach” to difference, which seeks to avoid “locat[ing] the problem in 
the person who does not fit in rather than in relationships between people and social 
institutions”). 
64 Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 197 
(Lennard J. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2006) (discussing the history of the social model). 
65 SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 20 (2009). 
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sign language, there would no longer be any communication barriers to 
disable deaf people.  This ideal would comport with the principles of 
universal design.  Universal design is the elimination of a distinction 
between a utility and its “accessibility features.”  Universally designed 
objects or systems accommodate, and ultimately benefit, everyone.66 
For example, curb cuts on sidewalks, crucial for wheelchair users, 
have benefited people pushing baby strollers and many others, and are 
often cited as a paradigmatic example of universal design.  Similarly, the 
laws requiring that television programming has closed captioning,67 
enabling deaf people to access any program, have benefited many 
hearing people.  Closed captioning is now routinely turned on in 
restaurants, gyms, and other public places not wishing to project the 
sound.  With curb cuts and television captioning, accessibility is built 
into the social fabric and can be used at any time by anyone. 
Universal design in the context of everyday, variable interactions 
between people (as opposed to television programming that can be 
captioned a single time and then displayed in accessible format 
indefinite times) poses a great challenge; our society, after all, is not 
Martha’s Vineyard in the nineteenth century.  Most Americans do not 
know ASL and the ADA does not require anyone to learn it.  Instead, the 
law requires covered entities to provide auxiliary aids and services when 
necessary to ensure effective communication with deaf people.  The law 
does not compel the deaf person to pay for auxiliary aids and services.68  
Such a requirement would run contrary to the social model’s 
understanding of disability as the product of a disabling environment.  
Instead, the ADA places responsibility on covered entities to ensure that 
they do not create or perpetuate the disabling environment.  However, 
as we have seen, many covered entities choose to evade their legal 
responsibilities when it requires them to incur even minimal costs. 
This discrimination is economically “rational” only from the 
perspective of the covered entity.  From a social perspective, such 
discrimination entails costs in the form of barriers that exclude deaf 
                                                 
66 See M. David Lepofsky & Randal N.M. Graham, Universal Design in Legislation:  
Eliminating Barriers for People with Disabilities, 30 STATUTE L. REV. 97, 98 (2009) (“The basic 
premises of Universal Design are (i) that persons with disabilities ought to have 
meaningful access to the same products, buildings, and facilities as everyone else and (ii) 
that enhanced accessibility benefits everyone.”); see also Douglas K. Rush & Suzanne J. 
Schmitz, Universal Instructional Design:  Engaging the Whole Class, 19 WIDENER L.J. 183, 187–
88 (2009) (detailing principles of universal design and arguing for the integration of 
universal design into law school instruction). 
67 See 47 C.F.R. § 79.1 (2010). 
68 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2010) (prohibiting surcharges by Title II entities); id. 
§ 36.301(c) (same prohibition on Title III entities). 
Stein and Teplin: Rational Discrimination and Shared Compliance: Lessons from Title
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
1110 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
people and result in lost productivity.  As we have seen with television 
captioning and curb cuts, universal design benefits not just people with 
disabilities but everyone.  When auxiliary aids and services such as 
interpreters and real-time captioning are integrated into the social fabric, 
hearing people and deaf people are able to communicate more 
efficiently, resulting in productivity gains. 
B. Accommodation as Antidiscrimination 
In order to imagine a more economically efficient ADA which results 
in the greater inclusion of deaf people in society, we explore the ADA’s 
roots as an antidiscrimination law borrowing heavily from prior statutes 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex, race, and religion, most 
pertinently the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Traditional antidiscrimination 
law would clearly prohibit the dentist in our example from refusing to 
serve women patients because they are women, or Muslim patients 
because they are Muslim.69  Such discrimination is based on prejudice 
and animus and is economically irrational—the dentist is losing out on 
the prospective patients’ business.  Likewise, the ADA prohibits the 
dentist from refusing to treat a patient because he is deaf.70  The ADA 
therefore treats people with disabilities as a minority group akin to a 
historically disadvantaged racial, ethnic, or religious group.71 
This approach reflects a long-standing demand among disability 
rights advocates for equality through civil rights rather than charitable 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., Bollenbach v. Bd. of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1472 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(articulating that “the fact that the Hasidic clientele strongly prefer male [bus] drivers does 
not [justify discrimination]”); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 302 n.25 (N.D. 
Tex. 1981) (“If an employer could justify employment discrimination merely on the 
grounds that it is necessary to make a profit, Title VII would be nullified in short order”); 
Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative:  An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 
1335, 1373 (1997) (“If customers feel uncomfortable doing business with female executives 
or being served by male flight attendants, that’s the customers’ problem”).  Outside the 
employment context, see, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–22 (1984) (finding 
exclusion of women from the Jaycees actionable discrimination); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding constitutionality of public 
accommodations part of Civil Rights Act in context of hotel refusing to rent rooms to 
African-Americans); United States v. Gulf-State Theaters, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 549, 552 (N.D. 
Miss. 1966) (rejecting theater’s defense that white patrons objected to presence of African-
American patrons). 
70 See, e.g., Sumes v. Andres, 938 F. Supp. 9, 11–12 (D.D.C. 1996) (granting summary 
judgment against doctor who refused to treat deaf patient because he believed “all deaf 
people are high risk” but had not made any inquiry into patient’s condition). 
71 BAGENSTOS, supra note 65, at 21–22.  As Bagenstos has explained, advocates for 
disability rights have not uniformly embraced this view of disability; some adopt a more 
universal view of disability. 
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laws.72  Beginning in the 1970s, disability rights advocates began to argue 
that social welfare provisions intended to assist them also impugned 
their autonomy and hindered their participation as full citizens.73  In 
many ways, the ADA represents the fruits of these efforts.  The Civil 
Rights Act addresses racism not by offering subsidies to employers and 
other entities which would otherwise exclude historically disadvantaged 
racial groups, but by penalizing those entities which engage in such 
exclusion and thus perpetuate subjugation and inequality.  Likewise, the 
ADA is a fault-based regime that imposes upon entities encountering 
deaf people the responsibility to eliminate communication barriers that 
the law views as resulting from the entity’s own conduct.74 
Despite this similarity in approach, it has been contended that the 
Civil Rights Act and the ADA differ in that the former prohibits 
discrimination based on animus while the latter also prohibits 
economically rational discrimination.75  For instance, the dentist’s denial 
of interpreter services likely stemmed not from any dislike of deaf 
people generally, but rather from her simple cost-benefit analysis.  The 
discrimination banned by traditional antidiscrimination law, it has 
therefore been argued, is economically irrational, while the ADA also 
proscribes economically rational discrimination.  Based on these and 
other distinctions, numerous scholars and even judges have urged that 
the ADA’s accommodation mandate is fundamentally different than 
more traditional antidiscrimination law.76 
Many scholars, however, have explained how the distinctions 
between antidiscrimination and accommodation are overblown.77  
Traditional civil rights statutes, after all, also prohibit conduct that 
results in a disparate impact on individuals in a protected class, even 
when there is no stereotyping or discriminatory animus present.  
Christine Jolls offers as an illustration a grooming policy, adopted by a 
Domino’s pizza franchise, which prohibited male employees from 
                                                 
72 See generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY:  PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993). 
73 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (2004). 
74 BAGENSTOS, supra note 65, at 69. 
75 Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 880 (2001). 
76 Lisa Eichhorn, Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the ADA:  The Limits of the 
Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REV. 575, 605 (2002); Pamela S. Karlan & George 
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 
(1996); see also Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Title I of the 
ADA . . . requires employers to consider and to accommodate disabilities, and in the 
process extends beyond the anti-discrimination principle.”). 
77 Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001); 
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference:  ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004). 
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wearing beards.78  Because a certain skin condition makes it difficult or 
impossible for a significant number of black men to shave, but has no 
such effect on white men, the Eighth Circuit struck down the franchise’s 
rule as having an impermissible disparate impact on African-American 
men.79  The court concluded that the franchise could not establish a 
business necessity for the rule, exempting it from liability, “even though 
it had acted in response to perceived customer concerns about bearded 
employees.”80  Likewise, job selection criteria, such as certain physical 
requirements for a police officer position, may be discriminatory if it 
disproportionately and negatively impacts female applicants and is not 
justified by business necessity.81  Indeed, some courts have explicitly 
recognized that disparate impact law can impose costs on employers.82 
As these examples illustrate, in addition to banning decisions based 
on prejudice and animus towards a group, traditional antidiscrimination 
law also prohibits economically rational discrimination.  Employers may 
not “engag[e] in intentional race or sex discrimination even when a 
rational, nonbigoted, purely bottom-line-oriented employer would 
engage in that conduct.”83  An employer cannot decline to hire a person 
because, even though the employer is not prejudiced, it anticipates that 
customers’ preference for having a person of a particular sex in the job 
will hamper business.84  Title VII does allow employers to make 
decisions based on an individual’s religion, sex, or national origin when 
such a quality “is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise.”85  This, however, is an “extremely narrow exception.”86  
Notably, it does not include decisions based on race.87 
The ADA likewise prohibits discrimination based on economically 
rational discrimination, which we have observed in our practice to be the 
                                                 
78 Jolls, supra note 77, at 653. 
79 Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 796–99 (8th Cir. 1993). 
80 Jolls, supra note 77, at 654. 
81 Id. 
82 See, e.g., EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000) (“It is true 
that antidiscrimination statutes impose costs on employers.  That is obvious in disparate-
impact cases, when the employer is told to change a policy that may not have been adopted 
for discriminatory reasons (though that is its effect) and so presumably is efficient.”). 
83 BAGENSTOS, supra note 65, at 67. 
84 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981); Diaz v. 
Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971). 
85 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006). 
86 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); see also, e.g., supra note 69 (noting 
justifications for discrimination that the Bollenbach and Wilson courts did not accept). 
87 See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982) (“It is . . . not 
irrational, but it is clearly forbidden by Title VII, to refuse on racial grounds to hire 
someone because your customers or clientele do not like his race.”). 
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increasingly dominant form of discrimination against deaf people.88  
While deaf people are without doubt severely hindered by hearing 
people’s prejudices towards them, more often discrimination takes the 
form of a covered entity simply not wanting to pay for the cost of 
ensuring effective communication. 
Despite the broad similarities between traditional antidiscrimination 
law and the ADA in prohibiting discrimination that is both economically 
irrational and rational, however, we discern an important distinction.  
Accommodations made pursuant to traditional antidiscrimination laws 
are often difficult to quantify:  how can an employer measure the cost of 
hiring a man despite the preference of its customers to see a woman in 
the job?  As one district court concluded, “an employer’s mere 
‘beforehand belief’ that sex discrimination is a financial imperative” 
cannot by itself justify sex-based hiring criteria.89 
In the context of rational discrimination, therefore, traditional 
antidiscrimination law generally requires the employer or public 
accommodation to absorb a potential (and sometimes illusory) future loss.  By 
contrast, ADA accommodations can involve actual capital expenditures 
which can be calculated in advance.  Many accommodations required by the 
ADA are readily quantifiable and easy to measure against the profit 
generated by a customer or worker with a disability.90  The dentist, for 
example, was able to ascertain in real financial terms that the cost of 
interpreter services for the deaf man’s visit would exceed her office’s net 
profit from his visit.  Indeed, it would be a rare interpreter who would 
agree to perform a job without first clarifying her hourly rate and 
mandatory minimum payment. 
In addition, in the specific context of accessibility for deaf people, the 
steps necessary to ensure access often do not facilitate the kinds of cost 
efficiencies that sometimes occur in addressing other types of barriers for 
people with disabilities.91  Accessibility features such as ramps and 
                                                 
88 See BAGENSTOS, supra note 65, at 65. 
89 Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
90 See, e.g., Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1515 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying motion to 
dismiss complaint by employee whose disability made it impossible to take public 
transportation to work and who requested that her employer pay for a parking space in the 
vicinity, even though the space cost “$300–$520 a month, representing 15–26 percent of her 
monthly net salary”). 
91 A further obstacle to cost efficiency is the fact that deaf people do not have uniform 
means of communication.  Some deaf people use sign language as their primary means of 
communication.  Other deaf people do not know sign language and instead rely on 
lipreading or captioning to receive information.  The auxiliary aids and services necessary 
to ensure effective communication with a deaf individual in a specific situation may not 
result in effective communication with the same individual in another situation.  The 
classic example is that writing notes may result in effective communication when placing a 
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elevators, installed during construction or following litigation, often 
result in permanent, increased building accessibility.92  Similarly, as 
noted earlier, captioning television programming is a one-time 
expenditure; once a program is captioned, the captions can be displayed 
an infinite number of times to an infinite number of people for no 
additional charge.93  By contrast, the cost of auxiliary aids and services 
for deaf people to ensure effective communication between two or more 
individuals in real time is an expense that must be borne each time 
communication takes place. 
Although many covered entities may initially be willing to bear such 
expenses, or to bear them to a limited extent, they may refuse to provide 
auxiliary aids and services once they realize that the expenditures are 
potentially endless and may place them at a competitive disadvantage.  
Howard Rosenblum’s experience with the Midwest Center on Law and 
the Deaf offers a telling illustration.  Rosenblum, a deaf attorney, co-
founded an attorney referral center for deaf people who could not 
otherwise find counsel despite having meritorious cases.94  The Center’s 
staff initially struggled to find attorneys willing to represent deaf people 
because of the cost of communication access.  Those whom they 
eventually recruited were initially appreciative of the new business but 
became disenchanted when they realized that they were bearing the cost 
of communication access “for the whole legal profession.”95  These 
lawyers did not want to be at a competitive disadvantage relative to their 
peers who eschew their legal obligation to ensure effective 
communication for deaf clients.  
                                                                                                             
restaurant order but not when attending a university lecture.  Covered entities may be 
required to undertake an interactive process with the deaf person in order to learn which 
auxiliary aids and services, if any, are necessary to communicate effectively with that 
person.  As a result, entities often cannot fully anticipate their legal obligations in a specific 
situation until they have encountered the deaf person or received an advance request for 
auxiliary aids and services. 
92 See, e.g., Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 893–94 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that to 
avoid “piecemeal compliance,” a blind patron who had only experienced poor signage in 
single restroom nonetheless had standing to sue for building-wide ADA violations 
affecting blind individuals). 
93 The debate regarding the cost of captioning in movie theaters has centered on the cost 
of installation, not on ongoing costs.  See, e.g., Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins 
Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing a case in which 
plaintiffs sought captioning in movie theatres).  See also John Waldo, The ADA and Movie 
Captioning:  A Long and Winding Road to an Obvious Destination, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1033 
(2011) (presenting a discussion of the use of captioning at movie theaters). 
94 See generally Howard A. Rosenblum, Communication Access Funds:  Achieving the 
Unrealized Aims of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061 (2011). 
95 Id. at 1072. 
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In short, the ADA reflects a historical move of disability rights 
activists “From Good Will to Civil Rights,”96 but its antidiscrimination 
mandate fits imperfectly in the context of disability discrimination.  The 
distinctions between traditional antidiscrimination law and Titles I 
through III suggest that economically rational discrimination is a much 
more potent and pervasive force in the context of ADA compliance than 
in other civil rights areas.  The ADA may be quite similar, normatively, 
to other antidiscrimination laws, but we have no doubt that its 
accommodation mandate is perceived as an unfair economic burden by 
covered entities because it requires out of pocket expenditures which are 
more readily quantified in advance and which often must be incurred on 
an ongoing basis.  Increasing ADA compliance—and, ultimately, the 
greater inclusion of people with disabilities in our society—will require 
solutions that acknowledge and directly address the economic 
disincentives presented by the law’s accommodation mandate. 
C. Making Matters Worse, the ADA is Underenforced 
Against the economic reasons not to comply with the ADA discussed 
above, the ADA offers the threat of liability as a reason to comply with 
the ADA.  Potential liability, however, can only provide an economic 
incentive to comply with the ADA if litigation is a real possibility.  
However, the law is broadly underenforced. 
Title III in particular has suffered from enforcement problems 
because it does not provide for damages.97  Only injunctive relief is 
available.98  This statutory limitation hinders enforcement in several 
crucial ways.  Because the resources of nonprofit and governmental 
enforcement agencies are severely limited, ADA enforcement depends 
on the willingness of practitioners in the private bar to represent deaf 
people who have experienced discrimination.99  However, in Buckhannon 
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human 
Resources, the Supreme Court barred the recovery of statutory fees absent 
a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties” 
                                                 
96 RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS:  TRANSFORMING FEDERAL 
DISABILITY POLICY (2d ed. 2001). 
97 See RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM:  THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 166 (2005) (describing the unavailability of damages under Title III 
as its primary impediment to enforcement). 
98 28 C.F.R. § 36.504 (2010).  Civil penalties are recoverable only in Title III enforcement 
actions commenced by the Attorney General.  Id. 
99 See Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 447 
(2007) (noting that “the ADA is heavily dependent on private enforcement” but that those 
efforts are hindered by various impediments and arguing for more robust enforcement by 
governmental entities). 
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such as a consent decree.100  At any time after a Title III lawsuit has been 
filed, a defendant might moot the case and undermine the plaintiff’s 
ability to recover attorney fees, by making the change the plaintiff 
sought.101  The result is that Title III entities often can evade liability by 
immediately modifying discriminatory policies after the lawsuit is filed 
and then moving to dismiss the case as moot.102  While of course 
redressing a discriminatory policy is ultimately good for deaf people, 
Buckhannon has severely limited incentives for attorneys in the private 
bar to pursue ADA Title III cases, an effect that has hindered deaf 
people’s ability to enforce their right to effective communication. 
Moreover, private attorneys themselves are subject to Title III and 
beset with the same considerations of economically rational 
discrimination hindering compliance outside legal offices.  They, too, 
discriminate against deaf people.  Many deaf people who would like to 
bring discrimination claims based on the failure to ensure effective 
communication under Titles I through III cannot find an attorney who 
will remove the communication barriers necessary to facilitate proper 
representation.103 
                                                 
100 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001).  Moreover, when attorneys do obtain the award of attorneys’ 
fees, they are able to recover only the lodestar, which is the amount of hours worked 
multiplied by a rate commensurate with prevailing market rates paid to attorneys 
representing fee paying clients, without any enhancement to compensate for the high risk 
of civil rights litigation.  City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992); Bagenstos, 
Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies, supra note 37, at 10?11.  The result is that 
attorneys working on a contingency basis will inevitably earn an effective hourly rate lower 
than their colleagues with fee-paying clients.  Id.  Without the prospect of recovering a 
contingent amount of the plaintiff’s damages, attorneys are even less economically 
incentivized to represent ADA plaintiffs than they are other kinds of civil rights plaintiffs. 
101 See Tressler v. Pyramid Healthcare, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518–19 (W.D. Pa. 2006) 
(claiming mootness and attorney fees unavailable where addiction facility initially declined 
to admit blind patient but ultimately did provide treatment).  Assertions of mootness due 
to remediation, however, are susceptible to challenges that the remedial actions are 
insincere, temporary, or incomplete.  See, e.g., Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 
F.3d 1173, 1184?89 (11th Cir. 2007) (claims of blind mother prohibited from accompanying 
son to examination room with her service animal not moot despite clinic’s adoption of 
service animal policy). 
102 To establish standing to bring a claim for prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff must 
show not only that she has been injured in the past but also that she is at risk of suffering a 
similar injury in the future.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); see also Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto 
Ctr., LLC, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1216 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing factors a court may consider in 
determining the likelihood an ADA Title III plaintiff will return to a noncompliant 
business).  But see Clark v. McDonald’s Corp., 213 F.R.D. 198, 227 (D.N.J. 2003). 
103 See, e.g., Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and Joseph 
David Camacho, Esq., Albuquerque, New Mexico Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, Dep’t of Just. No. 202-4937 (2007), http://www.ada.gov/albuquerue.htm.  The Justice 
Department has sued several law offices for refusing to ensure effective communication 
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Even without the barriers that make it difficult for deaf ADA 
plaintiffs to find attorneys willing to represent them, litigation is a slow 
and high-risk means of dispute resolution.  The priority of the deaf man 
denied interpreter services from the dentist is probably finding another 
dentist, not vindicating his rights.  Once he finds a dentist willing to 
ensure effective communication through the provision of interpreter 
services, he may lose motivation to sue the discriminatory dentist, who is 
then emboldened to refuse future requests for interpreter services by 
other deaf clients. 
We do not suggest that the dentist, let alone every other 
noncompliant entity, knows about the myriad hindrances plaguing ADA 
enforcement when they decide not to make themselves accessible to deaf 
people.  We do suggest that rampant noncompliance is self-perpetuating.  
The dentist probably did not know of many other businesses that had 
been successfully sued by ADA plaintiffs.  To the contrary, she may have 
observed that her competitors were also choosing noncompliance.  The 
threat of litigation does not provide a sufficiently strong incentive to 
comply with the law when not complying seems economically rational in 
the short term. 
D. What to Do? 
In response to these well-documented problems, commentators have 
generally proposed reforms which would increase incentives to litigate, 
in the belief that more litigation will result in greater enforcement.104  We 
do not disagree with this basic proposition.  We believe, however, that 
even with more litigation, enforcement problems will persist because the 
threat of future litigation does not always outweigh the perceived 
immediate burden of incurring expenses to provide auxiliary aids and 
services to ensure equal access for deaf people.  Moreover, litigation is a 
costly process that must be initiated each time that discrimination occurs; 
because it is not possible to sue every discriminatory entity, some 
portion of those who choose noncompliance will inevitably “win” the 
gamble in choosing noncompliance. 
We believe that the path to greater compliance lies not in 
encouraging more lawsuits but in removing the economic disincentives 
to comply with the ADA.  If individual entities no longer had to consider 
cost when determining whether to provide auxiliary aids and services 
because they had already paid in advance along with their competitors, 
                                                                                                             
with deaf clients.  Id.; see also Elana Nightingale Dawson, Lawyers’ Responsibilities Under Title 
III of the ADA:  Ensuring Communication Access for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, 45 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 1143 (2011); Rosenblum, supra note 94. 
104 Bagenstos, Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies, supra note 37. 
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these disincentives would disappear.  In fact, it would become 
economically irrational to discriminate as entities would no longer want 
to turn away deaf people who are productive workers or paying clients.  
Moreover, they would want to utilize the services for which they had 
already paid.  Paying for communication access in advance and in 
concert with competitors is precisely what Title IV demands of the 
telecommunications industry, and what we suggest all other entities 
should be required to do as well. 
IV.  TITLE IV:  DIFFERENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, DIFFERENT RESULT 
We now turn our attention to Title IV, which has succeeded where 
Titles I through III have failed in aligning economic incentives to ensure 
that deaf people have full access to communication.  Title IV’s relay 
services mandate has worked by spreading the cost of communication 
access equitably among all common carriers. 
A. The History of Relay Services 
Until the late 1990s, devices called TTYs were the predominant 
means for deaf people to make telephone calls.105  TTYs are 
teletypewriters, which work by sending coded signals over telephone 
lines to other TTYs which translate the signals into text for the receiving 
party to read.106  Individuals with TTYs can communicate with one 
another over telephone lines by placing telephone receivers on TTYs and 
typing messages to one another. 
One limitation of TTYs, however, is that both parties to the call are 
required to have a TTY.  Most hearing people do not have TTYs.  An 
informal system developed in the late 1960s and 1970s where private 
operators with a TTY would “relay” calls between a deaf TTY user and a 
hearing telephone user.107  The deaf person would type to the “relay” 
person who would read out loud the typed message.  The hearing 
person would respond verbally for the “relay” person to type back to the 
TTY user.  These underfunded private efforts could not meet demand 
and states started providing this service on a limited but growing scale 
                                                 
105 S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 78 (1989); KAREN STRAUSS PELTZ, A NEW CIVIL RIGHT:  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUALITY FOR DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING AMERICANS 131–32 
(2006). 
106 47 C.F.R. § 64.601(a)(8) (2010); In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., the ADA of 1990 & the 
Telecomms. Act of 1996, 12 FCC Rcd. 1152, 1154 n.15 (1997).  Although TTYs are still in 
existence, the advent of computers, the internet, and personal device assistants (“PDAs”) 
has rendered TTYs largely obsolete. 
107 STRAUSS PELTZ, supra note 105, at 56–61. 
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in the 1970s and 1980s.108  Title IV of the ADA codified this developing 
practice by requiring it on a national scale.109 
Title IV amended the Communications Act of 1934 by requiring 
common carriers to provide telecommunications relay services 
(“TRS”).110  The statute defines “telecommunications relay services” as 
“telephone transmission services” which permit people with hearing or 
speech impairments a means of communicating with hearing people 
“functionally equivalent” to how two hearing people communicate over 
the telephone.111  Title IV prohibits charging relay users rates greater 
than those charged for “functionally equivalent voice communication 
services.”112  The FCC, which is charged with implementing Title IV, has 
explained that the process of calling the TRS provider to initiate a relay 
call is the functional equivalent of reaching a dial tone.113 
On July 26, 1991, the one-year anniversary of the ADA’s signing, the 
FCC promulgated regulations governing the provision of relay services.  
In its order announcing the regulations, which established minimum 
standards for providing relay services,114 the FCC stated that 
                                                 
108 Id. at 58–61; see also In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 12 FCC Rcd. at 1152 n.4 (noting that 
prior to the enactment of Title IV, “some states offered relay services, but the services 
offered differed from state to state, and were subject to many limitations” (citing Strauss, 
Title IV—Telecommunications, in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 156–
58 (Gostin & Beyer eds. 1993))); In re Access to Telecomms. Equip. and Servs. by the 
Hearing Impaired and other Disabled Persons, 3 FCC Rcd. 1982, 1987–88 (1988) (noting that 
state relay services were usually limited to intrastate calls). 
109 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2006). 
110 Id. § 225(c). 
111 Id. § 225(a)(3). 
112 Id. § 225(d)(1)(D).  This law requires the FCC to implement regulations which “require 
that users of telecommunications relay services pay rates no greater than the rates paid for 
functionally equivalent voice communication services with respect to such factors as the 
duration of the call, the time of day, and the distance from point of origination to point of 
termination.”  Id. 
113 In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing 
& Speech Disabilities, 19 FCC Rcd. 12475, 12534 (2004).  The FCC has been explicit in 
stating that relay services are the equivalent of telephone services.  Id.  Additionally,  
[i]n enacting Title IV of the ADA, and creating the federally regulated 
TRS scheme, Congress intended that persons with hearing and speech 
disabilities be provided with a means of communicating with hearing 
individuals through a third party—the CA—who relays the 
conversation between the parties.  To this end, as we have frequently 
explained, the TRS scheme is intended to ensure that persons with 
hearing and speech disabilities have functionally equivalent access to the 
telephone system. 
Id. 
114 In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities & the ADA 
of 1990, 6 FCC Rcd. 4657, 4659 (1991).  As part of these mandatory minimums, the FCC 
required that TRS providers “operate every day, 24 hours a day.”  Id. at 4669.  
Communications assistants are “prohibited from disclosing the content of any relayed 
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“[c]ompetition among TRS providers to attract customers to the 
service . . . should spur providers to achieve the highest quality 
service.”115  The FCC referenced this theme to encourage TRS providers 
to hire communications assistants with high typing speeds116 and to offer 
customers discounted toll rates.117  As the FCC envisioned, the interstate 
relay system would depend upon reliable and efficient TRS providers, 
ideally competing with each other to offer superior services. 
The FCC struggled, however, with the issue of how interstate relay 
services should be paid for and did not determine a specific cost 
recovery mechanism until February 1993, just months before common 
carriers were required to begin providing interstate TRS.118  In this 
February 1993 order, the FCC discussed its consideration of two 
proposals.  One proposal was a shared-funding mechanism that would 
require interstate common carriers to pool their resources by 
contributing to a fund used to reimburse relay service providers.  
Another proposal was a self-funding proposal, which would have 
required interstate common carriers to fund their own provisions of 
relay services. 
This was a critical fork-in-the-road moment for relay services.  A 
self-funding mechanism would have paralleled Titles I through III, 
which require those entities that come into contact with deaf people to 
pay for the cost of communicating with them.  As we have explained, 
many of these covered entities engage in a cost-benefit analysis which 
leads them to risk violating the law by not providing auxiliary aids and 
                                                                                                             
conversation regardless of content” or “intentionally altering a relayed conversation and 
must relay all conversation verbatim unless the relay user specifically requests 
summarization.”  Id. at 4668; see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.604 (2010); Germano v. Int’l Profit Ass’n, 
544 F.3d 798, 803–04 (7th Cir. 2008). 
115 In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 6 FCC Rcd. at 
4659. 
116 Id. at 4658–59.  In 2000, the FCC would require communications assistants to have a 
minimum typing speed of sixty words per minute, citing technological improvements.  In 
re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & 
Speech Disabilities, 15 FCC Rcd. 5140, 5171–72 (2000). 
117 In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 6 FCC Rcd. at 
4663. 
118 Id. at 4664; In re Telecomms. Servs. for Hearing-Impaired & Speech-Impaired 
Individuals & the ADA of 1990, 5 FCC Rcd. 7187, 7190–91 (1990).  The law breaks down 
relay services into interstate relay calls between relay users in different states and intrastate 
relay calls between relay users in the same state.  Title IV requires the FCC to provide 
generally that “costs caused by interstate telecommunications relay services shall be 
recovered from all subscribers for every interstate service and costs caused by intrastate 
telecommunications relay services shall be recovered from the intrastate jurisdiction.”  47 
U.S.C. § 225(d)(3)(B) (2006).  The discussion which follows concerns the funding for 
interstate relay calls; intrastate relay calls are funded at the state level.  Id. § 225(d)(3). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 [2011], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss3/7
2011] Lessons from Title IV of the ADA 1121 
services such as interpreters.  The self-funding mechanism would place 
telecommunication companies in a similar position to that of the dentist 
whose deaf patient requests interpreter services for his visit. 
The FCC, of course, could not know how economic disincentives 
would hinder the effectiveness of Titles I through III.  Nonetheless, the 
FCC anticipated the problem of rational discrimination, noting “that a 
self-funding mechanism would provide incentives for carriers to handle 
fewer relay calls, to degrade relay calling quality, to migrate relay 
customers to other carriers, and to restrict relay to only their 
presubscribed customers.”119  Dentists, lawyers, and other entities 
covered by Titles I through III engage in equivalent downgrading every 
day—they seek the least expensive means of engaging with deaf 
employees and consumers instead of the most effective means.   
In light of this concern, the FCC selected shared funding as “the best 
interstate TRS cost recovery mechanism because it spreads the financial 
liability to all subscribers of every interstate service.”120  The FCC 
explained that “by compensating TRS providers based on actual relay 
minutes, those TRS providers who provide excellent service to the public 
and thereby generate strong demand, will benefit.”121  Accordingly, a 
shared funding mechanism would “create strong incentives for TRS 
providers to offer high quality, innovative service at a reasonable 
cost.”122 
With these goals in mind, the FCC established an interstate relay 
services fund to which all carriers of interstate services are required to 
contribute.123  The shared funding mechanism works by estimating the 
cost of providing relay services for the following year and dividing that 
number by the estimated interstate revenue base to yield a “contribution 
factor.”  Interexchange carriers determine their contributions to the fund 
by multiplying their expected interstate revenues by the contributing 
factor.124  In this fashion, each interexchange carrier make contributions 
                                                 
119 In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities & the ADA 




123 In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & the ADA of 1990, 8 FCC Rcd. 5300, 5303 (1993). 
124 The initial contributing factor was 0.00047 for the period July 26, 1993, through April 
26, 1994.  Id.  This figure was the equivalent of a 0.047% tax on interstate revenues.  The 
contributing factor has fluctuated slightly over the years.  For the 2010–11 fund year, the 
FCC set the contributory rate at 0.00585, at the equivalent of a 0.0585% tax on end-user 
revenues.  In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with 
Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 25 FCC Rcd. 8689, 8689–90 (2010).  In 1999, the FCC adjusted 
this revenue collecting scheme to focus on end-user revenues rather than gross interstate 
revenues.  1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Streamlined Contributor Reporting Requirements 
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to the fund based on their market share of interstate revenues, not based 
on the extent to which deaf individuals use their company’s services.125 
The TRS fund makes payments to relay service providers based on 
the number of “minutes of use” of relay services provided and payment 
rates which the FCC adjusts on a periodic basis.126  The FCC has 
explained that reimbursing providers based on the minutes of relay 
services provided “encourage[s] providers to develop efficient and cost-
effective TRS programs.”127  The TRS administrator periodically adjusts 
the reimbursement rate, which varies by the type of relay service 
provided.128  Only those providers which comply with the mandatory 
minimum standards for the provision of relay services are eligible for 
reimbursement.129  Deaf people choose the TRS provider which will 
receive reimbursement every time they make a call. 
                                                                                                             
Associated with Administration of Telecommunications Relay Services, North American Numbering 
Plan, Local Number Portability, and Universal Services Support Mechanisms, 16 Commc’ns Reg. (P 
& F) 688, 1999 WL 492955 (F.C.C.) ¶ 8 (July 14, 1999). 
125 At the intrastate level, states recover the cost of the intrastate service contracts from all 
ratepayers in the state, whether through an intrastate subscriber line surcharge or through 
a general ratemaking process.  In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for 
Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 15 FCC Rcd. 5140, 5156 (2000).  With 
respect to the provision of intrastate relay services, states have generally employed a 
competitive bidding process to select a single relay service provider which relay users must 
then use to make all intrastate relay calls.  In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-
Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 16 FCC Rcd. 4662, 4664–
65 (2001); In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs., 15 FCC Rcd. at 5156; In re 
Telecomms. Relay Servs., the ADA of 1990 & the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 12 FCC Rcd. 
1152, 1154 n.13 (1997).  Some states have employed a multi-vendoring system in which 
several vendors compete with each other in providing relay services.   In re Telecomms. 
Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs., 15 FCC Rcd. at 5158.  Although the FCC has stated 
that “competitive forces are generally the preferred way to improve service quality and 
bring new services to customers” and that “giving consumers a choice among different TRS 
providers might well improve the quality of TRS service in different states,” it has stated 
that FCC rules do not prohibit single vendor arrangements.  Id. at 5157.  Nonetheless, the 
FCC has “encourage[d] states to consider whether the single- or the multi-vendoring model 
best meets their constituents’ particular needs” and “to continue experimenting with ways 
to allow competitive forces to improve the quality of TRS service.”  Id. at 5157–58. 
126 In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & the ADA of 1990, 8 FCC Rcd. at 5305. 
127 Id. 
128 In June 2010, the most recent month for which reimbursement was made, relay 
services were reimbursed at between $1.2801 and $6.7025 per minute depending on the 
type of relay service provided.  See Nat’l Exch. Carrier Ass’n, TRS Monthly Fund Reports, 
NECA, https://www.neca.org/cms400min/NECA_Templates/TRSInterior.aspx?id=1253 
(click on “August” under 2010) (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
129 In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & the ADA of 1990, 8 FCC Rcd. at 5305. 
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B. A Marketplace for Innovation in Telecommunication Access 
The results of the FCC’s funding structure have been spectacular.  In 
setting up a regime that rewards relay service providers for attracting 
relay users, the FCC instantly created a new marketplace for providing 
deaf people with equal access to telephone services.  New companies 
quickly developed to meet this need and competed with one another for 
the privilege of providing relay services. 
This relay marketplace has resulted in innovations in services, 
making telephone services ever more accessible to deaf people.130  When 
interstate relay services were first provided, deaf people could only place 
relay calls using a TTY.  Relay users had the option of choosing between 
full TRS, in which the TTY user reads and types the entire conversation, 
and partial TRS, in which the TTY user has the option to voice or listen 
for himself.131 
In the years that have followed Title IV and the advent of 
compulsory TRS funding, relay service providers have competed to offer 
new forms of relay services.132  The direct descendant of TTY relay 
services is internet protocol (“IP”) relay.  Through IP relay, deaf people 
may use computers or personal device assistants such as a Blackberry or 
iPhone to place or receive text relay calls.133  Another new form of relay 
that has become popular with deaf people is captioned telephone relay.  
In this form of relay, the relay operator does not type what the hearing 
person is saying.  Rather, the relay operator uses voice-recognition 
software which has been trained to recognize the relay operator’s voice.  
The relay operator re-voices what the hearing person says and the words 
                                                 
130 In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing 
& Speech Disabilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 20577, 20580–81 (2005). 
131 When a relay user chooses “voice carry over” (“VCO”), the relay user speaks for 
himself and then the relay operator types the hearing caller’s response.  When a relay user 
uses “hearing carry over” (“HCO”), the relay user (typically a hearing person with a speech 
impairment) types his words and listens to the hearing caller’s response.  In re Telecomms. 
Relay Servs., the ADA of 1990 & the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 12 FCC Rcd. 1152, 1155 (1997) 
(describing VCO and HCO); In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing and 
Speech Disabilities & the ADA of 1990, 6 FCC Rcd. 4657, 4658 (1991) (requiring VCO and 
HCO when the first regulations were promulgated). 
132 In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 12 FCC Rcd. at 1157 (“Since the implementation of TRS in 
July 1993, many TRS providers have, on their own initiative, sought to develop innovative 
forms of TRS by offering services and features not required under the Commission’s 
current rules.”). 
133 In re Provision of Improved Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for 
Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 7779, 7781–83 (2002).  Both 
intrastate and interstate IP calls are reimbursed by the interstate fund.  Id. at 7786. 
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come up on the deaf caller’s end, whether through a computer, personal 
device assistant, or a specially ordered phone.134 
In addition to making telephone calls using text-based relay, deaf 
people can also now place video relay calls using sign language.  In the 
late 1990s, the first trials were conducted for video relay services 
(“VRS”), which allow a deaf person to use a sign language interpreter to 
make telephone calls.135  In this form of relay, the deaf person and the 
interpreter each have a videophone which permits them to see each other 
and use sign language to communicate with each other.  This service 
proved popular among deaf people who were able to make telephone 
calls in real-time using their native language.136  In 2000, the FCC stated 
that it would permit reimbursement for relay service providers which 
chose to offer this service.137  Subsequently, competition among relay 
service providers has been so intense that companies have provided deaf 
people with free videophones to encourage them to use their services.138 
Relay service providers also now provide services in languages other 
than English.  TRS providers must provide text-based relay services in 
Spanish and have the option to do so in other languages as well.139  Relay 
service providers may also receive reimbursement for providing VRS 
between ASL users and Spanish speakers.140  At least one relay service 
                                                 
134 See In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with 
Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 18 FCC Rcd. 16121, 16122?23 (2003). 
135 In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 12 FCC Rcd. at 1158. 
136 STRAUSS PELTZ, supra note 105, at 132–35.  Text-based relay calls are much slower for 
relay service providers to process because communications assistants cannot type as fast as 
people can talk.  In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 12 FCC Rcd. at 1158. 
137 In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing 
& Speech Disabilities, 15 FCC Rcd. 5140, 5152 (2000).  The FCC has ruled that the interstate 
TRS fund may be used to fund intrastate VRS calls, explaining that this reimbursement 
scheme would permit it “to asses[s] demand and let market forces determine the 
technologies of choice for delivery of [VRS], while not depriving any consumer who is 
willing to invest in new technologies the ability to make any call, not just an interstate call.”  
Id. at 5154. 
138 The FCC does not reimburse VRS providers for the cost of providing videophones.  
See, e.g., In re Structure & Practices of the Video Relay Serv. Program, 25 FCC Rcd. 8597, 
8614 (June 28, 2010).  Some VRS providers sell videophones, while others provide 
videophones free of charge to encourage relay users to use their services.  See, e.g., 
SORENSONVRS.COM, http://www.sorensonvrs.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2011) (prominently 
advertising a free videophone for deaf and hard of hearing people who use sign language). 
139 In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 15 FCC Rcd. at 5154–55. 
140 In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing 
& Speech Disabilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 13140, 13149–55 (2005). 
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provider even offers the option to place VRS calls using interpreters who 
can translate to and from virtually any widely spoken language.141 
Finally, relay service providers must now offer speech-to-speech 
relay services.  This form of relay service uses specially trained 
communications assistants who can understand the speech patterns of 
relay users and repeat their words clearly to the hearing caller.142  This 
form of relay benefits users who may have difficulty typing or signing 
due to a physical disability.143 
This dizzying array of innovative relay services today provides deaf 
people with multiple options for placing and receiving relay calls as 
often as they would like at any time of the day for little or no cost.  The 
use of relay services has grown exponentially over the years as deaf 
people have had more options to choose from and have begun to take for 
granted that they can make telephone calls with the same ease as hearing 
people.  In December 2010, the most recent month for which data is 
available, TRS relay totaled 14,813,870 reimbursable minutes, or more 
than twenty-eight years’ worth of relay calls in a single month.  Of this 
total, VRS relay totaled 8,199,535 reimbursable minutes or more than 
fifteen years’ worth of relay calls in a single month.144   
This extraordinary growth in relay services has occurred even 
though relay services come with their own set of issues for users.  We 
have observed that text-based relay is painfully slow for relay users who 
must slow down their conversations; communications assistants typing 
verbatim what they hear cannot keep up with the rapid pace of speech.  
VRS confines the three-dimensional language of ASL to a two-dimension 
screen, and ASL can lose some of its meaning and clarity in the process.  
Moreover, the quality of the video is only as good as the internet 
connection; when the connection is poor, it can be difficult, if not 
impossible, for sign language users to see and understand each other 
clearly.145  Interpreters not physically present also have fewer 
opportunities to prepare in advance for the discussion and for the deaf 
individual’s signing method.  They cannot read the full body language of 
the conversants.  VRS also assigns interpreters at random; deaf people 
                                                 
141 This service works by pairing the communications assistant with a language line.  The 
relay service provider pays for the language line as a competitive feature.  See 
LIFELINKS.NET, http://www.lifelinks.net/index.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
142 In re Telecomms. Relay Servs., 15 FCC Rcd. at 5149–50. 
143 Id. 
144 TRS Fund Performance Status Report:  Funding Year July 2010–June 2011, NAT’L EXCH. 
CARRIER ASS’N (Aug. 31, 2010), https://www.neca.org/cms400min/NECA_Templates/ 
TRSInterior.aspx?id=1253 (click on “December” under 2010). 
145 See Position Statement:  VRI Services in Hospitals, NAT’L ASS’N DEAF (Apr. 2008), 
http://www.nad.org/issues/technology/vri/position-statement-hospitals. 
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can, however, channel through interpreters until they find an interpreter 
who they like. 
There is one additional important limitation to Title IV, which we 
discuss in the remainder of this Article.  From its conception, TRS has 
been conceived of as the functional equivalent of telephone services.  
Since hearing people do not ordinarily use the telephone to communicate 
with each other when they are in the same room, the FCC has ruled that 
relay calls between two people in the same room are not reimbursable.146  
Although the regulatory scheme does not prohibit relay service providers 
from providing relay services when the callers are in the same room, 
they will not receive reimbursement for such services.  Therefore, most 
relay service providers generally will not accept such calls for processing 
(although it is our understanding that some VRS providers have a policy 
of interpreting communications between two people in the same room in 
emergency circumstances).  As a result, the deaf person and the hearing 
person must resort to other means of communication when they are in 
the same room (if they do not choose to go into different locations to 
place a telephone call to one another).  In such instances, such as a visit 
to a dentist’s office, the other parts of the ADA may provide coverage.  
However, as described earlier in this Article, there are serious 
noncompliance issues with respect to those parts of the ADA. 
C. Lessons from Title IV 
Title IV’s success is all the more remarkable because Title IV evolved 
from the same principle as Titles I through III—that covered entities 
(here, common carriers), and not deaf people, should take responsibility 
for paying for the accommodations necessary to ensure effective 
communication.  Like Titles I through III, Title IV prohibits covered 
entities from placing a surcharge on deaf consumers to recoup the cost of 
providing accommodations.147 
                                                 
146 See In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with 
Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 19 FCC Rcd. 12475, 12537, n.466 (2004); In re Telecomms. 
Relay Servs. & Speech-to-Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 
16 FCC Rcd. 4054, 4058 (2000) (explaining that VRS is reimbursable through TRS funds 
while VRI is not); see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local 
Government Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,196 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. 
pt. 35) (“The FCC has made clear that VRS functions as a telephone service and is not 
intended to be used for interpreting services where both parties are in the same room; the 
latter is reserved for VRI.  The Department agrees that VRS cannot be used as a substitute 
for in-person interpreters or for VRI in situations that would not, absent one party’s 
disability, entail use of the telephone.”). 
147 47 U.S.C. § 225(d)(1)(D) (2006) (prohibiting common carriers from charging relay users 
greater rates than for functionally equivalent voice calls); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2010) 
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As discussed in Part III, Titles I through III impose the cost of 
communication access on the individual entity that happens to be 
approached by a deaf person.  As we have explained, the dentist is faced 
with a very real economic reason to disregard her legal obligation and 
not provide an interpreter:  she believes she will lose money on the deaf 
patient in doing so.  Making matters worse, if the dentist does fulfill her 
legal obligation, she might be approached by every deaf individual in 
the vicinity who was denied interpreter services by discriminatory 
dentists.  The result is a race to the bottom as covered entities seek to 
evade the costs of complying with the law even when such evasion risks 
safety, as in the Lockhart case when FedEx did not provide an interpreter 
for its deaf employee during meetings regarding its safety protocol.  It 
also poses the prospect of disenchantment among those who do fulfill 
their legal obligation and thus take on a comparatively larger and 
inequitable share of the cost of communication access relative to their 
competitors, as in the case of the attorneys receiving referrals from the 
Midwest Center on Law and the Deaf. 
Title IV avoids these compliance problems by requiring 
telecommunication companies to share the cost of access regardless of 
whether and to what degree deaf people use their services.  The shared-
funding mechanism makes it impossible for covered entities to engage in 
the sort of cost-benefit analysis that encourages economically rational 
discrimination.  The shared funding mechanism introduces a different 
kind of economic analysis that encourages equal access.  The question is 
not “how much money will I lose by paying for an interpreter?”  Rather, 
the question becomes, “how much will I benefit from interacting with 
the person whose deafness is incidental?”  If FedEx were a participant in 
a shared funding scheme and did not have to pay on the margin for 
interpreter services, it is entirely possible that Ronald Lockhart would 
still be working there today. 
When covered entities can consider only how much they can benefit 
from communicating with deaf people, economically rational 
discrimination disappears.  In its place, a vibrant marketplace springs up 
as covered entities compete for deaf customers.  In establishing a 
marketplace for relay services, the FCC created financial incentives for 
businesses to develop advancements in relay services technology which 
have made telephone services even further accessible to deaf people. 
                                                                                                             
(prohibiting surcharges by Title II entities); id. § 36.301(c) (same prohibition on Title III 
entities). 
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The FCC has analogized Title IV’s funding mechanism to “taxes 
levied solely on telecommunications providers.”148  Yet Title IV is not a 
subsidy program that might result in stigmatization.149  Its sole purpose 
is to redistribute the cost of accommodation within the 
telecommunications industry to ensure that the industry can meet its 
obligations to ensure equal access for deaf people.  Title IV simply 
applies a “pay upfront” approach to meeting the obligation to ensure 
effective communication while still staying squarely within the civil 
rights and antidiscrimination paradigm of the ADA.150 
What if we could import Title IV’s shared funding mechanism into 
the other titles of the ADA?  To analogize to dentistry, it would be as if 
the American Dental Association anticipated that its members would be 
approached by deaf patients and mandated that dentists contribute to a 
communication access fund based on their proportionate revenues; the 
fund would pay for interpreter services for deaf patients no matter 
which dentist they chose.  We posit that the outcome would result in 
higher compliance rates.  Further, from a normative perspective, no 
single business would have to pay more to ensure effective 
communication with a deaf person simply because the deaf person chose 
to interact with it rather than one of its competitors.  Rather, the cost of 
access would be spread equitably across all members of the industry or 
society. 
We do not argue that aligning economic incentives with access will 
completely eliminate discrimination.  Rather, we argue that it will 
eliminate economic incentives to discriminate, greatly boosting 
compliance rates, which would realize the promise of the ADA of 
including deaf people in all aspects of society.  If covered entities still 
refused to provide the necessary auxiliary aids and services despite the 
absence of an economically rational reason to do so, it would be much 
                                                 
148 In re Telecomms. Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities & the ADA 
of 1990, 9 FCC Rcd. 1637, 1640 n.25 (1993). 
149 Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom:  A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 
YALE L.J. 967, 1041 (1999) (reviewing “troubling evidence” that employment subsidies can 
stigmatize the workers it seeks to assist and therefore “harm [those workers’] employment 
prospects”). 
150 In this way, Title IV also addresses another problem with the economic model of 
Titles I through III on which we have not elaborated, namely the presumption that entities 
know of their legal obligation to ensure effective communication and how to fulfill it.  Of 
course, many entities approached by deaf individuals have little or no experience with deaf 
people and do not know how to achieve effective communication.  Title IV provides 
economic incentives for relay service providers to advertise their services and make their 
services user-friendly, reducing the need for consumers to invest time and resources in 
determining which services, if any, to use. 
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easier to impute a discriminatory motive such as animus towards deaf 
people.   
We recognize that Title IV’s shared funding mechanism has not been 
without problems.  In recent years, several relay service providers went 
beyond engaging in legitimate competition and began manufacturing 
demand for their services by hiring people to make telephone calls 
which served no purpose other than to inflate the number of relay 
minutes for which they could seek reimbursement.151  The Department of 
Justice has initiated prosecutions of individuals engaging in this 
practice.152  More recently, the FCC has begun instituting stricter rules 
such as limiting the reimbursement that relay service providers can 
receive for services provided to their own deaf employees.153  We believe 
that this enhanced regulatory oversight will reduce the potential for 
fraud and abuse. 
Despite the need to guard against abuse, Title IV has succeeded 
remarkably in rendering telephone services accessible and has been far 
more effective in eliminating communication barriers than the other 
titles of the ADA. 
V.  BRINGING TITLE IV INTO TITLES I, II, AND III:  SEMI-VOLUNTARY 
COLLECTIVE COMPLIANCE 
In recent years, several Title III entities have begun adopting 
mechanisms for spreading the cost of the auxiliary aids and services 
necessary to ensure effective communication with deaf people.  We 
describe several such instances below and then explore the implications 
of expanding the shared funding approach outside the context of Title 
IV. 
Breitbach v. St. Cloud Driving School illustrates how the lessons of Title 
IV were applied on a small, local scale.  In that case, several deaf 
teenagers sued five driver’s education schools in St. Cloud, Minnesota, 
all of which denied them communication access to the classes they 
offered.154  In settling their dispute, the parties might have agreed that 
the school contacted by each deaf person would be responsible for 
paying for the cost of interpreter services.  That is what Title III requires, 
but it would have prejudiced schools that happened to be contacted by 
                                                 
151 See, e.g., In re Structure & Practices of the Video Relay Serv. Program, 25 FCC Rcd. 
1868, 1870?71 (2010). 
152 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Six Charged in Nationwide 
Scheme to Defraud the FCC’s Video Relay Service Program (Nov. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-crm-1258.html. 
153 In re Structure & Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. at 1869–71. 
154 See Civil No. 06-1222 (DWF/RLE), 2006 WL 2265170 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2006). 
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the deaf person and resulted in a potentially uneven allotment of 
responsibility to pay for interpreters.  All of the schools, after all, had 
engaged in the exact same kind of discrimination. 
Instead, pursuant to a consent decree, the parties agreed that all five 
schools would share the cost of providing auxiliary aids and services to 
the plaintiffs and all future deaf students.  The schools agreed to jointly 
offer a class accessible to deaf and hard of hearing people three times a 
year.  Each school was to pay for a portion of the class based on its 
relative size and revenue.155  If no deaf student approached any school 
for driver education, the schools would not be required to host the 
accessible class; funding for the accessible class, however, was set aside 
preemptively.  Plaintiffs who had not yet commenced driver education 
training could approach the school of their choice, but all the schools 
shared the cost of providing auxiliary aids and services no matter which 
school the plaintiff chose.156 
The consent decree did not permit driving schools to evade their 
legal obligations.  The driving schools were still responsible for ensuring 
communication access on their own.  In compelling local competitors to 
share the cost of communication access, however, it checked the 
economic disincentives to avoid compliance in the future.  No school 
would be economically punished for opening its doors to deaf people 
when its competitors refused.  In addition, the schools would no longer 
be caught off guard by a deaf person’s request for an interpreter; money 
was already allocated for the purpose in advance. 
In another example of the collective compliance approach to 
communication access in Minnesota,157 emergency medical providers in 
the Minneapolis-St. Paul area established the Twin Cities Hospital 
Interpreter Consortium (“the consortium”), partly as a result of pending 
litigation against several emergency medical services providers that 
failed to ensure effective communication with deaf patients and family 
members.158  Each hospital pays an interpreter agency a monthly fee for 
the agency’s guarantee that it will provide an “on call” qualified medical 
interpreter within an hour eighty percent of the time and within two 
                                                 
155 See id. at *3–4. 
156 See id. at *3. 
157 Plaintiffs in Breitbach and the hospital cases that led to the consortium were 
represented by Rick Macpherson of the Minnesota Disability Law Center. 
158 See Minnesota Hospital Consortium Agreement (on file with authors).  There are forty 
interpreters in Minnesota qualified to interpret in the medical setting; three interpreters are 
“on call” at any given time under the consortium agreement.  Id. 
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hours one hundred percent of the time.  The hospitals pay an additional 
amount proportionate to their use of the service.159 
As with the driver education schools, there are a few features of the 
consortium that work to remove the typical economic disincentives 
plaguing compliance with Titles I through III.  First, the cost of 
communication access is spread among several competitors, so none will 
be at a competitive disadvantage when it is required to provide 
interpreter services for a deaf person.  In addition, the entities have 
already paid for the availability of interpreter services in advance of a 
particular request, so the economic pressure to find the cheapest way 
possible to communicate is greatly reduced.  Indicative of the success of 
this approach, complaints about the accessibility of the consortium 
members’ emergency rooms have been virtually nonexistent while the 
hospitals continue to be accused of failing to ensure effective 
communication outside the emergency room context—i.e., in-patient 
care—which the fund does not cover.160 
These examples of voluntary shared compliance in Minnesota reflect 
the resolution of lawsuits.  Other efforts to collectively pay for auxiliary 
aids and services that have not arisen from litigation work similarly by 
preemptively assessing a small tax on a large group of individuals or 
entities in anticipation of the need to communicate with deaf or hard of 
hearing people.  Several local bar associations,161 and at least one state,162 
have established so-called “communication access funds” (“CAFs”) 
through which attorneys can seek at least partial reimbursement when 
they provide interpreter services to deaf clients or potential clients.  
CAFs are typically paid for through bar association member fees.163  
However, it appears that many CAFs implemented as pilot projects have 
not been renewed beyond the initial period, and that many bar members 
(and deaf clients) are unaware of their existence.  Moreover, most CAFs 
                                                 
159 Interview with Martha Barnum, Commc’n Servs. for the Deaf, in St. Paul, Minn. (Nov. 
1, 2010).  Of course, this system retains a certain degree of economic disincentive to provide 
interpreter services because hospitals must pay an additional amount proportionate to 
their use of the interpreter services.  Because, however, the hospitals pay a portion of the 
amount upfront, their economic disincentives not to use the service are reduced. 
160 Id. 
161 See, e.g., Sign Language Interpreter Fund Reimbursement Application, PENN. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.pabar.org/public/committees/disabili/Sign%20Lang.pdf (last visited Nov. 
8, 2010); see also Sign-Up Fund, ADVOCACY INC., www.advocacyinc.org/SignUpFunFlyer. 
pdf (describing one year pilot program from Texas State Bar Association ending fall 2008). 
162 See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, §  48-A(4)(2009). 
163 For more information about the particular strengths and weaknesses of existing and 
previous CAFs, see Rosenblum, supra note 94, at 1077–87.  See also Communication Access 
Funds for Legal Services, NAT’L ASS’N DEAF, http://www.nad.org/issues/justice/lawyers-
and-legal-services/communication-access-funds (last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
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have been hindered by various restrictions on their applicability.  For 
example, CAFs might limit attorneys’ usage to a certain monetary 
amount, or they might cover only some types of auxiliary aids and 
services.164  As this illustration should make clear, shared compliance 
must be required in order to have a lasting effect, and shared funding 
mechanisms are most effective when they fully cover the cost of auxiliary 
aids and services.165 
We applaud these efforts to implement shared funding mechanisms 
which reduce or eliminate disincentives to provide equal access to deaf 
people.  Although limited in scope, these examples show that there are 
ways to avoid the pitfalls of economically rational discrimination while 
staying within an antidiscrimination paradigm. 
VI.  BUILDING ON TITLE IV’S SUCCESS: POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANDING SHARED 
FUNDING 
Title IV’s success lies in its compulsory industry-wide cost-sharing 
mechanism which ensures the accessibility of telecommunications 
services and has spurred a new marketplace for businesses to provide 
relay services.  As Part VI made clear, its approach to compliance can be 
incorporated on large and small scales, with or without litigation, and in 
the absence of any regulatory or congressional mandate.  In this Part, we 
explore three possible mechanisms for expanding the benefits of Title IV 
outside the realm of telephone services while also recognizing their 
drawbacks and limitations. 
A. Implement Mandatory CAFs 
The regulations for Titles I through III or the statutes themselves 
could be amended to establish a shared-funding mechanism similar to 
that found in the FCC’s regulations for Title IV.  For example, the EEOC, 
which is charged with implementing Title I, and the DOJ, which is 
charged with implementing Titles II and III, could establish a shared-
funding scheme requiring covered entities to contribute to a fund which 
would fully fund the cost of any auxiliary aids and services necessary to 
ensure effective communication with deaf people. 
                                                 
164 See Rosenblum, supra note 94, at 1086–87. 
165 CAFs have also generally required attorneys to pay the full cost of communication 
access up front and then seek reimbursement later, thus evading one of the crucial aspects 
of Title IV’s structure:  telecommunications companies’ obligation to pay for 
communication access is entirely fulfilled in advance, before any deaf person attempts to 
access their services. 
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These new funds could work in the same way as the TRS fund, by 
making payments to entities which provide auxiliary aids and services.  
For example, an agency that provides interpreters (remotely or on-site) 
or real-time captioning could provide the service free of charge to the 
covered entity and then bill the fund at rates set by the government 
regulator.  As with TRS providers, these providers of auxiliary aids and 
services would have economic incentives to find innovative ways to 
deliver auxiliary aids and services to those who need them.  They might 
distribute videophones or software free of charge to encourage the use of 
VRI or remote captioning.  They could also station interpreters in public 
spaces to provide interpreter services for a few minutes at a time as 
needed. 
Although covered entities would have to make contributions upfront 
to such a fund, we do not think that this proposal amounts to a tax 
increase.  Covered entities are already legally obligated to pay for the 
provision of auxiliary aids and services when necessary to ensure 
effective communication with deaf people.  In theory, mandatory CAFs 
would not change the amount of auxiliary aids and services procured; 
rather, they would reallocate these expenditures in a manner 
commensurate with an entity’s size instead of its happening to encounter 
a deaf person and compel entities to obtain such services in advance of 
those encounters. 
However, because the adoption of mandatory CAFs would eliminate 
economic disincentives for compliance, we expect that this would result 
in greater demand for auxiliary aids and services.  As a result, total 
expenditures on auxiliary aids and services would likely increase.  This 
rise in expenditures would be countered by savings due to the reduction 
in litigation and increases in productivity as hearing people and deaf 
people are able to communicate more effectively with one another.166 
B. Eliminate Title IV’s Restriction on Funding Relay Between People in the 
Same Room 
Another proposal is to remove the FCC’s reimbursement restriction 
on relay calls when the deaf person and the hearing person are in the 
same room.  Removing this limitation would result in much broader 
access to on-the-spot interpreter services.  A deaf person could go to a 
lawyer’s office and be able to pull up an interpreter immediately on a 
laptop computer with a webcam or even on his iPhone or iPad.  The 
                                                 
166 While we favor a broader approach, CAFs could also be introduced on a more limited 
scale, covering for example health care providers and lawyers or only a particular 
geographic region. 
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dentist would have no financial incentive to object to the use of relay 
services since it would cost her nothing.  She would even benefit from 
smoother communication with her deaf patient.167  The same would 
occur when a deaf person needed to communicate with a coworker, a 
teacher, or even a police officer. 
Even more broadly, expanding relay services would result in greater 
and much improved communication between deaf and hearing people in 
every context, not just interactions with covered entities which are 
employers with fifteen or more employees, state or local government 
agencies, and places of public accommodation.  Rather, deaf people 
would have instant access to interpreting services when communicating 
with anyone.  This could be a cousin at a family reunion.  This could be a 
random person on the street who comes up to the deaf person to ask for 
directions.  This could be a priest or rabbi (the ADA exempts religious 
entities from coverage168).  Deaf people would, for the first time, truly 
have access to all aspects of society through relay services.  Relay could 
become seamlessly integrated into daily life, much like a public utility. 
The technology already exists to provide remote interpreting 
services to facilitate communication between hearing people and deaf 
people who are located in the same room.  Title IV’s relay void has 
already been filled, to an extent, by video relay interpreting (“VRI”).  VRI 
providers offer video interpreting services for individuals who are in the 
same room.  VRI incorporates the same technology as VRS:  
videoconferencing equipment that permits the sign language interpreter 
and the deaf person to see each other and the interpreter and hearing 
person to hear one another.  VRS and VRI differ only in the payment 
mechanism.  Whereas VRS draws on the TRS fund, VRI providers charge 
users directly for the services provided.169 
                                                 
167 Interpreters, of course, are not exclusively “for” deaf people; rather, they assist two (or 
more) individuals who wish to communicate but do not speak the same language.  They 
are as much “for” the hearing person who does not know ASL as they are for the deaf 
person who does.  See Tim Wells, Moving Mountains:  Disabled Lawyers at the Top of Their 
Trade, WASH. LAW., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 25. 
168 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (2006). 
169 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 
75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,195–96 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35) (“Both VRI 
and VRS use a remote interpreter who is able to see and communicate with a deaf person 
and a hearing person, and all three individuals may be connected by a video link.  VRI is a 
fee-based interpreting service conveyed via videoconferencing where at least one person, 
typically the interpreter, is at a separate location.  VRI can be provided as an on-demand 
service or by appointment.  VRI normally involves a contract in advance for the interpreter 
who is usually paid by the covered entity.”); In re Telecomms. Relay Servs. & Speech-to-
Speech Servs. for Individuals with Hearing & Speech Disabilities, 16 FCC Rcd. 4054, 4058 
(2000) (distinguishing between VRI and VRS). 
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VRI is often used in the hospital setting, when time is of the essence 
in obtaining interpreters to communicate effectively with deaf people in 
times of emergency.  VRI permits hospitals to begin providing 
interpreter services almost immediately rather than having to contact an 
interpreter in the vicinity and then wait an hour or more for the 
interpreter to arrive.  VRI also allows hospitals in remote areas to 
provide appropriate interpreting services despite a dearth of qualified 
local interpreters. 
The DOJ recently promulgated new regulations governing VRI.  The 
new regulations define a VRI as “an interpreting service that uses video 
conference technology over dedicated lines or wireless technology 
offering high-speed, wide-bandwidth video connection that delivers 
high-quality video images.”170  Covered entities choosing to provide VRI 
must ensure that staff persons are adequately trained in the use of 
technology, that there is clear and understandable transmission of video 
and audio, and that the image is large enough to display the face, arms, 
hands, and fingers of the sign language users.171 
Recently amended ADA regulations endorse the provision of VRI as 
a tool which may be used to ensure effective communication with deaf 
people.  The DOJ added VRI to its illustrative list of auxiliary aids and 
services and amended the definition of the term “qualified interpreter” 
to define an interpreter who “is able to interpret effectively, accurately, 
and impartially, both receptively and expressively, using any necessary 
specialized vocabulary” and who is able to do so “via a video remote 
interpreting (VRI) service or an on-site appearance.”172 
Although VRI is growing in popularity among public and private 
entities, it suffers from the same fundamental problem as other auxiliary 
aids and services.  As is the case for on-site interpreters, public and 
private entities must pay individually for the use of VRI should they 
choose to provide the service.  The economic disincentives hindering 
compliance with Titles I through III make entities hesitant to sign a 
contract with a VRI provider unless they are certain that they will need 
to use its services. 
In suggesting that Title IV could be expanded to include VRI, we do 
not mean to suggest that VRI is always appropriate.  As the DOJ has 
recognized: 
                                                 
170 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, 
75 Fed. Reg. at 56,177. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
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VRI may not be effective in situations involving surgery 
or other medical procedures where the patient is limited 
in his or her ability to see the video screen.  Similarly, 
VRI may not be effective in situations where there are 
multiple people in a room and the information 
exchanged is highly complex and fast-paced.  The 
Department recognizes that in these and other 
situations, such as where communication is needed for 
persons who are deaf-blind, it may be necessary to 
summon an in-person interpreter to assist certain 
individuals.173 
The DOJ’s recognition that VRI is not always an appropriate auxiliary 
aid and service comports with its broader recognition that determining 
the appropriate steps covered entities must take to ensure effective 
communication with deaf people is context-specific.174  Notably, several 
hospitals have been sued by deaf individuals who assert that VRI did not 
ensure effective communication.175 
Clearly, VRI is no panacea.  VRI is of no assistance, for example, to 
deaf individuals who do not have access to videophone technology or to 
deaf-blind people.  Deaf people have also cited the three-dimensional 
nature of sign language as a reason for preferring an on-site interpreter 
to the two-dimensional interpreter on screen.176  Moreover, the use of 
VRI makes it more difficult for a deaf person to watch both the speaker 
and the interpreter at the same time.  For example, if a person is giving a 
                                                 
173 Id. at 56,196. 
174 One complaint has been that health care providers have not set up and used the 
technology correctly, meaning that the equipment often goes unused during times of need 
or that the deaf person and interpreter cannot see each other well.  See id. (noting “cases 
where the video monitor is out of the sightline of the patient or the image is out of focus; 
still other examples were given of patients who could not see the image because the signal 
was interrupted, causing unnatural pauses in the communication, or the image was grainy 
or otherwise unclear.”).  The new DOJ regulations should provide clarifying guidance to 
covered entities regarding their obligation to ensure that when they provide VRI services, 
they do so correctly and in appropriate situations.  Id. 
175 See, e.g., Gillespie v. Dimensions Health Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639 (D. Md. 2005) 
(identifying allegations that the VRI communication was ineffective “either because the 
staff was inadequately trained and unable to operate the VRI device, because Plaintiffs 
were unable to understand the video interpreter due to the poor quality of the video 
transmission, or both”).  In Gillespie, the hospital signed a consent decree.  Consent Decree 
Gillespie v. Dimensions Health Corp., 369 F. Supp. 2d 636 (D. Md. 2005) (No. DKC-05-CV-
73), available at http://www.ada.gov/laurelco.htm.  In the decree, the hospital agreed to 
modify its VRI policy.  Id. 
176 See Position Statement:  VRI Services in Hospitals, NAT’L ASS’N DEAF (Apr. 2008), 
http://www.nad.org/issues/technology/vri/position-statement-hospitals. 
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demonstration on how to use something, the deaf person may prefer that 
the interpreter stand next to the presenter so that both the interpreter 
and the presenter are in the same line of sight.  This is not always 
possible with VRI.177  The National Association for the Deaf (“NAD”), 
citing concerns about the limitations of VRI, has adopted the position 
that VRI should be used in hospital settings only to “fill the gap” in time 
until an interpreter arrives on site.178  On-site interpreters, as the NAD 
explains, “have more physical flexibility, have greater access to visual 
and auditory cues and information present in the environment, do not 
encounter technology or equipment malfunctions, and can respond 
immediately to communication events as they arise.”179 
We note, however, that in our experiences working with deaf people, 
many of the individuals who say they dislike VRI love their 
videophones.  As the skyrocketing numbers of reimbursable minutes 
indicate, deaf people are spending more time than ever using VRS to 
communicate with hearing people over the telephone despite the 
problems with relying on an interpreter who is not physically present.  
This increasing use of videophones suggests widespread acceptance of 
the use of remote interpreters to communicate with hearing people. 
In short, we recognize problems with VRI and VRS, many of which 
cannot be fully redressed through technological advancements.  VRI and 
VRS should never entirely replace on-site interpreters.  In our view, 
however, remote video interpreting is the future of communication 
between deaf and hearing people and its possibilities—instantaneous 
access to interpreter services, anywhere, at any time—exceed its 
limitations. 
As described above, telecommunications relay services are paid for 
by assessments on phone service providers that are passed on to 
consumers through a line item on their phone bills.  This present 
limitation to common carriers makes sense because TRS ensures only 
that the telecommunications industry is accessible to deaf people.  Were 
relay services broadened to include same-room communications, 
demand for TRS would grow as hearing and deaf people looked for 
inexpensive means to communicate productively with one another in all 
areas of life.  Ensuring the sufficiency of funds to reimburse relay service 
providers would require an expanded revenue pool.  It is not our 
purpose in this Article to identify a specific funding mechanism, but to 
illustrate the promises (and downsides) of removing the same-room 




Stein and Teplin: Rational Discrimination and Shared Compliance: Lessons from Title
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
1138 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
restriction on VRS that has worked so well in rendering telephone 
services accessible to deaf people.180 
C. Expand the ADA Tax Credit 
As we discussed above, the ADA provides small businesses with a 
limited fifty percent tax credit of up to $5,000 for access-related 
expenditures between $250 and $10,250.181  This tax credit does not, 
however, broadly redistribute the cost of access because small businesses 
must still bear a significant portion of the cost.  Moreover, because most 
small businesses are unlikely to encounter many deaf people, they may 
spend less than $250 on interpreter expenses and therefore fail to qualify 
for the tax credit (as might the dentist in our example who would have 
spent only $90 in providing a sign language interpreter).  The availability 
of this limited tax credit does not significantly dampen entities’ tendency 
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis, which in many circumstances still 
leads to economically rational discrimination. 
Another means of expanding the principle of Title IV—shared 
funding—would be to expand this tax credit to cover all expenses 
incurred by covered entities in ensuring effective communication with 
deaf people.  This approach would nearly eliminate economic incentives 
for economically rational actors to discriminate because they would be 
fully reimbursed for the cost of providing auxiliary aids and services. 
As with the first two proposals outlined above, broadening the tax 
credit would also broaden the marketplace for the provision of 
interpreter services.  With greater demand for interpreter services, VRI 
companies, interpreter agencies, and freelance interpreters would 
compete with each other to serve a larger market.  They would likely use 
the tax credit to advertise their services as “free” and look for ways to 
make it easy for covered entities to take advantage of their services.  We 
predict that the VRI industry would grow as businesses would continue 
to look for ways to provide interpreter services on demand without 
having to search for on-site interpreters and pay for the time and 
expense of bringing interpreters on-site. 
                                                 
180 We do not doubt that opening up relay services in this manner would result in 
exponential growth in demand for relay services.  We recognize that initially, there may 
not be enough qualified interpreters to meet this demand.  If there is a shortage in 
interpreter services, we believe that it is due to a shortage in demand brought on by 
economically rational discrimination.  We believe that once economically rational 
discrimination is eliminated and deaf people have the same access to communication as 
hearing people, market forces will correct any shortfall in supply.  As demand for 
interpreter services grows, so will wages for interpreters.  This will, in turn, spur more 
people to choose interpreting as a profitable and rewarding profession. 
181 See 26 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2006). 
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However, we do not believe that a one hundred percent tax credit 
alone would achieve the same results as opening up relay services to 
same-room communications.  Some entities may resist the notion of 
having to incur expenses and then seek reimbursement through the tax 
credit, temporarily losing access to those funds.  There is also an 
administrative burden associated with applying for and receiving the tax 
credit. 
Expanding the tax credit could complement the expansion of Title IV 
by removing economic incentives to discriminate against deaf people in 
instances when the use of VRI would not be appropriate.  For instance, 
were the dentist to have a deaf-blind patient who could not see a remote 
interpreter, the dentist could pay for a tactile sign language interpreter 
and then obtain reimbursement through a full tax credit.182 
D. Political Prospects for Reform 
We believe that the political prospects for reform are good.  The 
ADA enjoyed broad bipartisan support when it was enacted in 1990, and 
when it was amended in 2008 to broaden the definition of disability.  
More recently, a nearly unanimous Congress enacted the Twenty-First 
Century Act which, among other things, mandates more accessible 
telecommunications devices for deaf people and people with vision 
impairments.183  These reforms received support from the industries 
regulated by the statute. 
Disability rights legislation has enjoyed broad support because most 
people know another person with a disability.  Anyone can become a 
person with a disability.  Because disability can affect anyone at any 
time, dialogue about disability often avoids the rancor that surrounds 
race and sex discrimination. 
We believe that proposals to redistribute the costs of auxiliary aids 
and services would similarly receive broad support.  The ADA already 
places on covered entities the legal obligation to incur expenses when 
necessary to ensure effective communication with deaf people.  We 
recognize that Congress faces increasing pressure to avoid government 
imposed mandates, particularly on businesses.  However, our proposal 
to apply Title IV’s shared-funding mechanism to the other types of 
                                                 
182 Another possibility, which we do not consider at length here, would be to establish a 
national agency responsible for scheduling and paying for interpreter services upon 
request.  We believe that the tremendous administrative burdens associated with such a 
scheme would likely wash away the promise of real and instantaneous facilitation of 
communication between hearing people and deaf people. 
183 See Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. No. 111-260, 124 Stat. 2751 (2010). 
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industries and entities would not, in theory, increase total expenditures 
because covered entities are already required to incur these costs.  As we 
explained above in discussing the proposal of mandatory CAFs, 
adopting a shared-funding mechanism would simply reallocate 
expenditures in a more equitable fashion so that no single entity is solely 
responsible for the cost of providing auxiliary aids and services in any 
specific situation. 
We believe that the increasing demand for relay services 
demonstrates that hearing and deaf people would support the expansion 
of relay services, making it easier for them to communicate with one 
another in real-time.  From the perspective of industry, a broader 
distribution of communication access expenditures will decrease costs 
for those entities which do comply with the law.  Noncomplying entities 
would be assured that they were paying for communication access in a 
manner that did not place them at a competitive disadvantage.  Finally, 
we believe that disability rights groups and industry would support 
these proposals because they would reduce the need for, and thus 
likelihood of, costly litigation to ensure compliance. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Twenty years of FCC regulatory supervision under Title IV has 
proven what should have been obvious when the ADA was enacted:  
accessibility incurs real, quantifiable costs.  If required to pay out of 
pocket for these costs, businesses and government entities will more 
often than not disregard their obligation or choose the cheapest—rather 
than the most effective—option possible.  If, on the other hand, entities 
are required to pay for accessibility on a pro rata basis with their 
competitors in advance of any particular request for accommodation, 
greater accessibility will result. 
In our ideal society, a dentist does not think about losing $40 on a 
deaf patient’s visit, and deaf people can access all areas of society as 
comfortably as they do telecommunications.  The story of the deaf 
patient would be a tale of one ADA, not two.  Either the deaf patient 
would communicate with his dentist by pulling up a sign language 
interpreter on his iPhone, or the dentist would call an interpreter with 
whom she is familiar, knowing that a communication access fund would 
cover the expense or that she would be fully reimbursed through a tax 
credit.  We do not believe that this future is far off.  In fact, the future is 
already here with Title IV.  Importing Title IV’s compulsory shared-
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funding mechanism into Titles I through III will advance the ADA’s goal 
of including deaf people fully in all aspects of society.184 
                                                 
184 Although we focus on deaf people in our Article, the lessons of Title IV are not limited 
to deaf people.  The shared-funding mechanism could also be adopted to ensure the greater 
availability of auxiliary aids and services for people with disabilities in general.  For 
example, DOJ regulations also list as examples of auxiliary aids and services “effective 
methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals with visual 
impairments” such as “[q]ualified readers.”  28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104(2), 36.303(b)(2) (2010).  A 
shared-funding scheme could result in the greater availability of such auxiliary aids and 
services, resulting in the fuller inclusion of blind people in society. 
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